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 Outsourcing to INGOs and privatization have increasingly become solutions to low-
capacity healthcare sectors in developing countries. Although these phenomena are now 
common, there are large gaps in the existing literature surrounding whether INGOs and the 
private sector improve the capacity of states in the long-term, or if the increased influence of 
the other sectors is ultimately counterproductive.  Our research uses Cambodia as a case 
study to explore the interaction between each of the sectors involved in healthcare provision: 
the INGO sector, the private sector, and the public - or governmental - sector. In order to 
explore the long-term effects of these interactions, we conducted an extensive literature 
review, interviewed INGO directors and public health officials, collected data on health-
related budgets and outcomes, and distributed surveys to actors in the healthcare field. The 
research we conduct suggests that if left to act as principal primary care providers in the 
long-term, INGOs and private providers actually decrease state capacity and create gaps that 
inhibit states’ ability to develop. We find that both INGOs and privatization drain personnel 
and funds from the state, and that this is problematic given that neither of these alternative 
providers is able to provide effective long-term care. INGOs have labor and funding 
constraints that cause them to be unstable, while private providers create health systems that 
are inequitable and of low quality. Thus, reliance on sectors other than the government to 
provide the majority of healthcare is a short-sighted development policy. While our 
conclusions are revealing, more work is necessary to further explore the complexities of the 
interactions between these three sectors and what combination of actors is best able to 








 The Cambodian healthcare sector is divided into three primary types of care 
providers: the public sector, private sector, and INGOs. Public healthcare is government-
provided through the Cambodian Ministry of Health, frequently referred to as the MoH. 
Private healthcare is provided primarily through for-profit clinics and hospitals not under the 
purview of the government, and small practices run by individual physicians.1 INGOs are 
non-profit international organizations that have situated themselves in Cambodia in order to 
provide alternative healthcare services.  
 Our argument focuses on the interactions between these three pillars supporting 
health provision in Cambodia. Thus far, the government has been essentially unable to 
provide adequate healthcare services to its people due to a variety of factors, some of which 
include the destruction of the system during the Khmer Rouge, a general dearth of 
development work in public healthcare, and poor infrastructure creation and regulation. 
Despite massive amounts of international aid, the public health system has not improved 
sufficiently or rapidly enough to effectively meet health needs autonomously. In order to fill 
this gap in the provision of healthcare, the government has chosen to outsource much of its 
responsibility to foreign-run INGOs. Private sector practices and practitioners have assumed 
the responsibility of filling the remaining holes in the market.  
When discussing the current healthcare situation in Cambodia it is necessary to 
differentiate between outsourcing and assumption of government responsibilities to citizen 
                                                
1 For the purpose of this paper, pharmacies and other smaller non-registered healthcare providers will not 




health. “Outsourcing” is a term describing INGOs taking on traditional state responsibilities 
with the government’s blessing. This generally occurs through a partnership program with an 
established international organization and the local government. The stated goals of these 
integrated partnerships are “to actively enlist private capital, both human and financial, to 
help governments fulfill their responsibilities for providing equitable access to high-quality 
public services.”2 Often, however, this partnership morphs into high levels of control by the 
outside group and little substantive government involvement. Outsourcing can also occur 
more implicitly if the state’s capacity is especially low; in this scenario, there may not be a 
formal partnership program, but the government implicitly approves the INGOs work. 
Assumption, however, is used to frame the activities of healthcare providers in the private 
sector. In this case, there is an existing demand for healthcare, which the government is 
unable to supply, so private providers move into the market in order to take advantage of 
the latent opportunities and funding. Unlike outsourcing to a large organization, this is a 
market driven phenomena coordinated among many small actors. In developing countries, 
many of those small actors are not licensed to provide care and their work is unregulated.3 
While in developed countries privatization of healthcare is a purposeful strategy adopted by 
governments, in this case we define “assumption by the private sector” as a phenomenon 
lacking active government involvement - or, in fact, defined by the government purposefully 
turning a blind eye.  
                                                
2 N. Sekhri, R. Feachem, and A. Ni, "Public-private integrated partnerships demonstrate the potential to 
improve health care access, quality, and efficiency," Health Affairs 30, no. 8 (August 2011): 5-6, 
doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2010.0461. 
3 Peter Annear et. al, “The Kingdom of Cambodia Health System Review,” Health Systems in Transition 5, 






 Private assumption and INGO outsourcing, rather than giving the government the 
time and skills to build its own capacity, have instead further weakened the public healthcare 
system. Private health outsourcing undermines the public healthcare system in two ways. 
First, the participation of public health officials in dual practice - working in both a public 
and private capacity - prevents the government from maintaining an adequate supply of 
medical professionals and complicates the regulation of the private sector. Second, the 
private sector drains resources from the public sector. Although studies have shown that it 
provides a lower standard of care, public perceptions cause the majority of those in need of 
healthcare to look first to the private sector, allowing private providers to receive the 
majority of individual health spending instead of the public sector. The data indicates that an 
overwhelming percent of out-of-pocket health expenditure goes to private providers.4   
INGOs also contribute to the continued weakness of the public healthcare system. 
INGOs create additional brain drain from the public sector by offering better pay and 
benefits than government positions, drawing skilled workers into the INGO labor force and 
away from public positions. Moreover, because of the perception that INGOs are more 
reliable funding recipients than developing governments, they draw foreign and international 
funding away from the Cambodian government, depriving it of available resources.  
Thus, the continued reliance on the private and INGO sectors has produced a 
destructive cycle. The combined brain and resource drain deprives the government of the 
skilled labor and resources it requires to increase its health provision, and this in turn 
perpetuates the need for and reliance on private providers and INGOs and thus existence of 
privatization and INGOs. Since it appears to the government that needs are being met 
                                                




without effort or funding on its part, it lacks the desire to do the work necessary to reassume 
sole provision of healthcare, which perpetuates the system. The government’s lack of 
commitment to funding the public healthcare system is evident in the stagnate budget 
allocation for healthcare.  
We will show that this situation has dangerous long-term implications. The INGO 
sector is subject to personnel constraints and mission drift as it adjusts to stay relevant and 
maintain its funding in a fickle global aid market. As such, INGOs may abandon services 
they once provided in order to “chase” funding fads in a different part of the healthcare 
market. This long-term instability makes INGOs an insufficient sole provider and therefore 
a poor substitute for nationally provided healthcare. Privately provided healthcare in 
Cambodia lacks regulation, which is exacerbated by the conflict of interest created by dual 
practice, and causes the healthcare it offers to be overpriced and of a low quality. In 
summation, neither INGOs nor private healthcare are a stable nor effective long-term 
replacement for a national healthcare system, and may in fact leave the public health system 
weaker than it was previously.  
 






Figure 1: flowchart of argument. 
 
Although literature abounds concerning the negative effects of both privatization 
and outsourcing to INGOs, to our knowledge no research has been conducted into the 
interactions between these two processes and the implications they may have on the capacity 
of public healthcare systems in developing countries in the long-term. Therefore, we traveled 
to Cambodia and Thailand in August of 2016 to gather data. A full discussion of our 




the private and INGO sectors produces an undesirable cycle, which undermines both the 
capacity of the public sector in the present and incentives for governments to invest in the 
future of the public healthcare system.   
With this argument in mind, we will begin by discussing the historical events that led 
to Cambodia’s current situation and how the Cambodian healthcare system compares to 
other systems in the same region/income level/post-conflict status as Cambodia in order to 
demonstrate its value as a case study. We will then discuss the current state of the public 
health system and identify the systemic deficiencies that have led to the decision to 
outsource to INGOs and assumption by private sector actors. Then we will look at the 
INGO sector- definitions, how it operates, how it fits into the international civil society 
system, and how it operates in Cambodia particularly. After which, we will focus on privately 
provided healthcare- definitions, global argumentation for and against privatization, how it 
operates within Cambodia, and privatized healthcare outcomes. We will then lay out our 
research on how INGOs and privatization create resource and brain drain and thus decrease 
public health capacity. This will lead to a discussion of why INGOs and privatized 
healthcare are poor substitutes for a strong public health system (i.e. why we should care that 
public health capacity is decreasing). We will then complete our argument by discussing the 
path dependence of this situation and the difficulties the Cambodian government faces in 
building its capacity at this point given the aforementioned complications. To conclude, we 
will make suggestions for further research and the implications the Cambodian case study 





A Brief History 
Cambodia is a particularly compelling example of the interactions between the 
private, public and civil society sectors due to the history of its healthcare system, and thus 
serves as a useful case study for our research. While the details of what led to Cambodia’s 
healthcare situation are unique, we suggest that the processes unfolding there are applicable 
to a lesser degree in many developing countries. Understanding Cambodia’s health sector, 
then, is useful to understanding a cycle that could be affecting many countries globally - 
especially given the rise of both privatization and international actors in recent history.  
From 1975 to 1979 the Khmer Rouge attempted to return Cambodia to a model 
agrarian society and in the process destroyed the country’s healthcare infrastructure, namely 
supplies, personnel, venues, water, sanitation, and education. Many of the people who died 
during the process were those with the highest levels of education, and many of those not 
killed fled the country. In 1979, it is estimated that 20 doctors, 26 pharmacists, 28 dentists, 
and 728 medical students remained in Cambodia.5 As such, Cambodia started the 1980s with 
a blank slate from which an entirely new health infrastructure needed to be built. 
Cambodia’s progression was further complicated by the operations of the United 
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which assumed temporary 
administration of the country from 1992 to 1993. This was the first occasion in which the 
United Nations (UN) took over administration of an independent state for peacekeeping 
reasons. This high level of involvement by the UN in Cambodia during a key moment in its 
development led to a surge of other international aid - particularly in the form of 
international non-governmental organization (INGO) missions; as one interviewee recalled, 
                                                




“In the 90s Cambodia's whole health system was run by international NGOs. The provincial 
health directors worked for UNICEF and CARE and the rest.”6 Today, Cambodia has the 
second highest number of NGOs per capita in the world. The US Library of Congress 
estimates that there are 5,000 NGOs in Cambodia7 and even with about only half currently 
active, that equals around one active NGO for every 6,000 Cambodians. Cambodia, then, is 
a post conflict country marked by low income and weak infrastructure, but with a large 
INGO sector attempting to address its needs. The complete restart of the health sector in 
the 1980s, and the massive influx of INGOs in the 1990s it created, makes Cambodia a 
useful case study of the effects of outsourcing to INGOs and privatization. The lessons 
learned in Cambodia can be applied to other developing countries, even if their starting 
point was less dramatic than that of Cambodia. 
Cambodia’s Situation as Compared to its Peers 
In this section we will situate Cambodia, first by expanding on its designation as a 
developing country, then by providing information on its current health level, and finally by 
discussing the health systems in place. Cambodia serves as an excellent representative of the 
difficulties many developing countries face, but also has both a history and uniquely large 
non-governmental sector which makes the effects of INGOs and the private sector 
particularly quantifiable.  
Throughout this section (and indeed our work as a whole) we will compare 
Cambodia’s situation with those of its peers: Vietnam, Laos, Bangladesh, and Sierra Leone. 
These countries have all been chosen based on their economic situation and one additional 
                                                
6 Interview with URC employee, August 12, 2016. 





factor: the first three are within Cambodia’s region, and the last is a post-conflict country. 
The data for these countries is drawn from multiple sources including the Human 
Development Index (discussed later), the World Bank, the OECD, and the UN database, 
among others. 
Cambodia is extremely poor. The GDP per capita in the country is $1,158.7.8 This is 
not to say that the situation in Cambodia has not improved, indeed it has shown a consistent 
seven percent GDP growth rate per annum in recent years. Moreover in 2015 Cambodia was 
reclassified as a lower-middle income country per the World Bank’s designations.9 The fact 
remains, however, that Cambodia is below its peers: the average GDP per capita for a lower-
middle income country in 2015 was $2,002.1.10 Even Laos- one of its closest neighbors and a 
country generally considered less developed than Cambodia- has a GDP per capita of 
$1,818.4, nearly $700 dollars more per person than in Cambodia.11 The figure below further 
illuminates Cambodia’s global economic position based on World Bank and UN data: again, 
although Cambodia was recently redesignated a lower-middle income country, its GDP per 
capita suggests that it is more in line with the least developed countries of the world. 
Furthermore, other fragile and post-conflict countries12  have much higher GDP per capita 
than Cambodia.  
                                                
8 The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015), GDP per Capita (current US$), retrieved from: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=KH.  
9 Sodeth Ly, “Cambodia is now a lower-middle income country: What does this mean?” The World Bank 
Blog, August 11th, 2016, http://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/cambodia-is-now-a-lower-middle-
income-economy-what-does-this-mean.                                                                                                                         
10 The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015), GDP per Capita (current US$), retrieved from: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=XN.  
11 The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015), GDP per Capita (current US$), retrieved from: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=LA.  






(Figure 2: Cambodia’s GDP per Capita in current US dollars as compared to the averages for Least Developed 
Countries and Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations since 1990.)13 
 
Overall, the CIA Factbook describes Cambodia as “one of the poorest countries in Asia,”14 
putting it at the 180th position out of 230 for GDP per capita globally. 
GDP per capita can be a fairly one-dimensional metric, however. Thus, we look to 
the Human Development Index, a measure created by the United Nations that is a 
composite statistic of life expectancy, education, and income per capita indicators, to 
consider how Cambodia compares using a more dynamic development index. Cambodia 
                                                
13 The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015), GDP per Capita (current US$), retrieved from: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=KH-F1-XL. .  





fares no better using the HDI as a benchmark- it is in the 143rd position out of the 188 
countries ranked.15 It is evident, then, that Cambodia can be firmly considered both a poor 
and developing country, even as it edges up the ladder. 
We next consider the health outcomes of Cambodia’s people compared to its peers, 
as our work is focused on health systems. The WHO estimated that in 2002 healthy life 
expectancy (HALE) at birth was 47.5 years (45.6 for males and 49.5 for females) in 
Cambodia. This was similar to Lao PDR (47.0), but significantly lower than Thailand (60.1) 
and Vietnam (61.3).16 As a further example, Cambodia’s infant mortality rate in 2015 was 
24.6 per 1000 live births. In comparison, Vietnam had a rate of 17.3 and Thailand had a rate 
of 10.5, however Cambodia’s rate is smaller than that of Laos PDR with a rate of almost 
double (50.7).17 The combination of these statistics demonstrates that despite improvement, 
Cambodia’s health outcomes remain low, and require significant improvement to reach 
global health standards.  
In light of these data, we turn to examine the global consensus on Cambodia’s health 
system. In 2016, the WHO ranked Cambodia at position 174 out of the 191 countries based 
on its health system performance.18 This exceedingly low ranking is due to Cambodia’s low 
health expenditure and weak health provision. In 2014, Cambodia’s health expenditure was 
5.7% of GDP. This leaves Cambodia ranked at 127th out of 191 countries for health 
expenditure, according to the CIA Factbook, with the lowest ranked country spending 1.8% 
                                                
15 “Human Development Index and its components,” United Nations Development Programme Human 
Development Reports, last modified 2016, http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI.  
16 “The World Health Report 2004: Changing History,” The World Health Organization (2004): 132.  
17 The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015), Mortality Rate, infant (per 1,000 live births), 
retrieved from: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN.  
18 Ajay Tandon, Christopher Murray, Jeremy Lauer, and David Evans, “Measuring Overall Health System 





and the highest 17.9%.19 The effects of lack of government spending on healthcare are 
exemplified by the number of health workers available. The World Health Organization 
estimates that fewer than 2.3 health workers (physicians, nurses, and midwives only) per 
1,000 people is insufficient to achieve coverage of primary healthcare needs20. The CIA 
Factbook estimates that in the Cambodian system there are only 0.17 physicians per 1,000 
people - putting the healthcare system significantly below the level already defined by the 
WHO as insufficient. In comparison, Vietnam has 1.19 doctors per 1,000 people.21 
Additionally, Cambodia has a ratio of 0.71 hospital beds per 1000 people, in comparison 
with 2.1/1000 in Thailand and 3.1/1000 in Vietnam.22 See figure below: 
   
(Figure 3: Hospital beds per 1000 population, selected countries.)23 
                                                
19 “CIA World Factbook” 
20 “Achieving the health-related MDGs. It takes a workforce!”, World Health Organization, 
http://www.who.int/hrh/workforce_mdgs/en/.  
21 “CIA World Factbook” 
22 Annear et. al, “The Kingdom of Cambodia Health System Review,” 82.  
23 Eurostat Statistics Database, OECD Health Data (2012), accessed January 1, 2017. Found in: Annear et. 




These statistics, however, do not accurately represent the provision of public 
healthcare, as they include total provision of care - not just care provided by the government 
and the public system. This makes these numbers misleading, as “private providers 
outnumber government facilities.”24 The numbers are even more disparate when looking at 
advanced care techniques and diagnostic methods, such as MRI or CT scans, which remain 
rare and are most commonly only available in the private sector.25 That is to say: these data 
concerning number of doctors per 1,000 people and number of hospital beds are inflated 
beyond what the public sector itself is actually providing. In all, Cambodia’s health system is 
particularly weak, even among its economic and geographic peers.  
In the future, according to the WHO, and like many of its peers, Cambodia still faces 
several major health challenges including, “high maternal, child and neonatal mortality,” 
“malnutrition,” “limited access to safe water and sanitation,” “a growing epidemic of 
noncommunicable diseases (NCDs),” and “the double burden of communicable diseases 
and NCDs.”26 Although the overall health system has shown improvements, in several key 
indicators of health Cambodia has recently fallen further behind. For example, only 69% of 
households in the 2014 demographics survey report using salt with some iodine, whereas 
83% reported usage in the 2010 survey.27 The rate of improvement also differs drastically 
                                                
24 Annear et. al, “The Kingdom of Cambodia Health System Review,” xxiv. 
25 Annear et. al, “The Kingdom of Cambodia Health System Review,” 84.  
26 “Cambodia-WHO: Country Cooperation Strategy 2016-2020,” World Health Organization Western 
Pacific Region (2016): 9,  
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/246102/1/WPRO_2016_DPM_004_eng.pdf.  





between urban and rural areas. In urban areas, 52% of households have access to improved 
sanitation, whereas the access rates are much worse in rural areas.28 
In summary, Cambodia is firmly a developing country, with the low health outcomes 




                                                




II. The Public Sector 
 
Description of the System 
The first, and most straightforward sector, involved in health provision is the public 
sector. This term refers to the health system run and operated by the national government of 
Cambodia through its Ministry of Health (MoH). In order to provide background for the 
interaction between the three groups involved in healthcare, we will begin by providing an 
overview of the structure of Cambodia’s public health system including: infrastructure, 
personnel, insurance system, bribes, and budgeting.  
The infrastructure of the public health system is based on a layered pattern of care 
provision shared between the provinces and districts of the country. At the top level, the 
Directorate General for Health oversees health service delivery through 24 MoH Provincial 
Health Departments (PHDs). Within these provinces there are also a total of 81 health 
Operational Districts (ODs). Each PHD operates a provincial hospital and governs the 
ODs’ operations and funding. Each operational district covers ~100,000–200,000 people 
with a Referral Hospital - delivering mainly secondary care, and a number of Health Centres. 
Health Centres operate on the smallest and most local level of care provision and cover 
~10,000–20,000 people - providing mainly preventive and basic curative services. Less 
formal Health Posts are located in the most remote areas.29 
The Cambodian government has begun decentralizing healthcare with the goal of 
providing increased access and quality of care to rural regions in line with the passage of the 
Health Strategic Plan 2008-2015. There remains a great need for further health quality and 
                                                




systems regulation. Currently, there are four laws covering the health sector: (i) the 1996 Law 
on the Management of Pharmaceuticals, amended in 2007; (ii) the 1997 Law on Abortion; 
(iii) the 2000 Law on Management of Private Medical, Paramedical and Medical Aid Services; 
and (iv) the 2002 Law on Prevention and Control of HIV/AIDS.30 Although several 
strategic plans have been passed in recent years in an attempt to universalize the health 
system, no supporting legislation, with enforcement capabilities, for improving quality and 
access have been passed since 2007 - a marked decline in the rate of legislative reform.  
Employment  
 Since 1979 and the devastation of the health workforce by the Khmer Rouge when 
only 25 doctors survived, significant gains have been made in rebuilding the human 
resources of the health sector. There is still room, however, for great improvements in both 
quantity and performance of staff in public health provision. Cambodia is still significantly 
below the WHO suggestions for number of health professionals given their population, and 
most of the existing staff is highly concentrated in the capital, Phnom Penh.31 According to 
data published by the MoH, they currently employ 19,457 civil servants in the health sector, 
“most of whom are nurses (about 46%) and midwives or midwife associates (about 24%).”32 
Doctors comprise only 14% of the health workforce, with only 1% being specialists, 
meaning there are approximately 2,723 public health doctors in the entire country.33 The 
MoH estimates that they will need to expand the total public health workforce to 32,000 by 
2020 in order to meet WHO standards and raise the health worker-to-population ratio from 
                                                
30 Annear et. al, “The Kingdom of Cambodia Health System Review,” xxii. 
31 Annear et. al, “The Kingdom of Cambodia Health System Review,” xxv. 
32 Annear et. al, “The Kingdom of Cambodia Health System Review,” 87. 




13.6 to 19.9 per 10,000 population. In order to achieve this ratio, the WHO suggests that 
Cambodia will have to increase both its salaries for health staff and its training and 
educational capacity.34 Currently, the average base salary (including allowances) for a 
government health professional is only about $100 per month, and doctors and specialists 
earn only 50% more than the average.35 This is significantly lower than the average salaries 
for comparable countries. In an interview with an executive from the University Research 
Company36 we were told, “the wages are really low because only just about 20 to 25 percent 
of the Ministry of Health budget goes on salary. In most of the poor countries that figure's 
45 to 55 percent.”37 Additionally, in the 2009-2010 academic year only 79 individuals 
graduated from public sector health institutions with a degree as a medical doctor.38 Overall, 
the Cambodian public health system is astoundingly low on doctors, has very few entering 
the system, and, thus far, lacks the infrastructure to attract more.  
Health Equity Fund  
There is no compulsory health insurance or social health insurance coverage 
provided by the Cambodian government. There is a small voluntary health insurance market 
of private for-profit insurance companies and not-for-profit schemes, which primarily serves 
rural communities and urban workers, but coverage remains very low and are available only 
to those who can afford to pay premiums.39 The relatively new subsidized Health Equity 
Fund (HEF) for the poor provides coverage and financial protection for approximately a 
                                                
34 Annear et. al, “The Kingdom of Cambodia Health System Review,” xxv. 
35 Annear et. al, “The Kingdom of Cambodia Health System Review,” 76. 
36 See: http://www.urc-chs.com/asia/cambodia  
37 Interview with URC employee, August 12, 2016. 
38 Midterm Review of the Health Workforce Development, DFAT (2011). Found in Annear et. al, “The 
Kingdom of Cambodia Health System Review,” 97. 




quarter of the national population - however, both the depth and breadth of the program 
remain limited and dependent on INGO financing; according to an executive of the INGO 
that manages the HEF system: “We're supposed to hand that [system] to a government 
agency. That's been a stated goal for the last 10 years and the government has not been able 
to form an agency. Due to internal politics, basically.”40 Additionally, World Bank Report 
Preliminary findings show that only 46% of those qualified for the HEF use it when they 
need health services.41 Based on our interviews, it appears that this is largely due to two 
difficulties. First, illiterate individuals struggle to complete the application process. Second, 
receiving a Poor ID is dependent upon the approval of the community village council - a 
system which can be almost impossible due to favoritism practices as well as the 
embarrassment of being defined as “poor” within your community. This process was 
described to us in the interview clip included below: 
The mechanism is that there is a poor ID card distributed to poor people in 
the community through the process mechanism of pre-identification. So if 
they assess my house as if oh I am poor then I am issued a card. And with 
that card I can go to the health center for free of charge or minimum charge 
or whatever it depends on the benefit package. The result was that only 46 
percent of those poor people with the ID poor card use that service. And the 
others just use private service. So the question mark is [do we give] “A for 
the effort” to donor and the government for support to help all the poor 
people just to serve 46% and not the 100% of them?42  
 
In order to be eligible for the HEF subsidized care, a poor person must have an 
“Equity Card,” commonly referred to as a “Poor ID” which is issued through the national 
“Identification of Poor Households Program” of the Ministry of Planning - facilitated by the 
                                                
40 Interview with URC employee, August 12, 2016. 
41 Kelsall and Heng, “Inclusive healthcare and the political settlement in Cambodia,” 13.  




village councils.43 HEF benefits allow eligible poor people to seek healthcare at any public 
health facility nationwide.44 This could have the effect of increasing traffic to public health 
centers rather than private facilities, as those who qualify for HEF seek to claim its benefits. 
In contrast, it could also reduce the incentives for private health centers to provide equitable 
care to those on HEF plans who are unable to pay.  
Currently, the day-to-day management of the HEF system is carried out at the 
Operational District level. INGOs are contracted to perform the functions of a HEF 
Operator at these levels. The program at the largest level is currently run, operated, and 
largely financed by the University Research Company (URC), an INGO based in Maryland 
that is one of the largest INGOs regularly operating in Cambodia.45  
The HEF is relevant not only for its financing role in the public health system, but 
also as an example of the interactions between the MoH and the INGO sector. It also has an 
effect on the effectiveness of private sector health provision. All three aspects will be 
addressed later in our thesis. 
Bribery 
When describing the public health sector it is imperative to mention the system of 
patronage ingrained in the sector. In order to be employed by the Ministry of Health, 
doctors must pay a bribe between three and six thousand dollars; as summarized by one 
interviewee: “You buy the job. It's a franchise.”46 They must then pay another bribe of 
roughly equal amount to buy their way into the province where they would like to be 
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stationed.47 For many, Phnom Penh, the capital city, is ideal, and those who can afford it will 
pay thousands of dollars to be stationed there - on top of the bribe they paid to be accepted 
into the MoH in the first place.48 Once employed by the MoH, public physicians are 
expected to pay a yearly bribe to their head of department,49 and there are implicit 
expectations of bribery at numerous other points; for example, if a superior has a baby there 
is an understood monetary scale for the gift given, which depends on the employee’s rank. 
The rent and patronage system for public employees was described by one interviewee as 
both unspoken and astoundingly complex, he went on to say:   
[It] is bizarrely opaque and bizarrely unexplainable by political scientists. No 
one has ever written a decent, as far as I know, no Westerner has ever 
understood the Cambodian patronage system. And I think it may be because - 
I'm not sure Cambodians understand the Cambodian patronage system. It just 
doesn't match anybody else's, but it's everywhere...There's a lot of things you 
have to do within the system...if you go to a wedding you have to do certain- 
every Cambodian knows exactly how much money they have to pay… And at 
the highest levels,you know, the secretaries of state and ministers and stuff 
are, you know, 25 to 50 thousand dollars. So serious amounts of money 
moving around. So you know what you have to do within the system. And I 
think, to some degree, you know what you're expected to receive, though 
from what I can tell that's not particularly tangible. But you don't know how it 
works. It's like the Wizard of Oz, it's all behind- except it's not one guy behind 
the curtain. And I'm not sure that anybody actually runs it exactly, the way 
that Daly ran Chicago.50 
 
Beyond bribery, family name and connections are key for advancement in the MoH. 
Those who do not know someone in a position of power are unlikely to be promoted or 
placed in a desirable province.51 In short, the public system could never be mistaken for a 
meritocracy- the corruption is so unavoidable that it is impossible to even enter the system 
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without immediately participating in extortion. Those who cannot pay the bribe, do not have 
the connections, or would prefer to advance based on merit must find employment 
elsewhere.  
Budget and Expenditure 
 One of the most important aspects of the Cambodian health system, and one to 
which we will refer repeatedly in this paper, is the public health budget in Cambodia. Despite 
increasing GDP and its redesignation to lower-middle income status as per the World Bank’s 
designation,52 Cambodia’s expenditure on healthcare as a percentage of total government 
expenditure has been decreasing, as evident in the figure below: 
 
(Figure 4: Cambodia’s health expenditure as a percent of total government expenditure from 2007 to 2014, as 
compared to Vietnam’s.)53 
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Note that in 2014 health expenditure was 6.1% of total government expenditure. In 
comparison, Cambodia’s neighbor Vietnam spent 14.2% of its government expenditure on 
health in the same year- this is notable considering that in 2007 both countries spent 9.1% of 
their budget on health. Comparing Cambodia’s health budget decrease with Vietnam’s 
increased allocation makes clear the significance of Cambodia’s downward trend. Having 
started from the same allocation, it is telling that Cambodia’s budget for healthcare has fallen 
- it demonstrates that the Cambodian government has been either unwilling or incapable of 
maintaining a competitive level of healthcare expenditure. 
 To further illustrate this point, in 2014, the Cambodian government spent $14 per 
capita on healthcare, less than Sierra Leone, Laos, or Vietnam.54 Moreover, while that 
allocation has been increasing for Cambodia’s peers, in Cambodia the trend has been largely 
decreasing or flat since 1995.55 Considering how much official development aid (ODA) 
Cambodia receives,56 this trend is both surprising and disturbing. The figures below put in 
perspective the magnitude of ODA Cambodia receives in comparison with the decreasing 
trend of its health expenditure: 
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(Figure 5: Government health expenditure compared to ODA since 2000.)5758 
(Figure 6: Government health expenditure compared to ODA from 2007 to 2014.)5960 
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 As evident in figure five, between 2000 and 2014, ODA doubled while the 
percentage of the public budget allocated to healthcare significantly decreased. Figure six 
focuses on the period between 2007 and 2014 and reinforces that the decrease in 
government health expenditure has not been a one time or recent change- allocations to 
health have been continually decreasing while ODA has remained at nearly $800 million. 
Although not all ODA is directed to the health sector, a significant amount is -  indeed, 19% 
of ODA in 2012 went to the health sector.61 Furthermore, the World Health Organization 
shows that the Cambodian public health system has been dependent on ODA for a large 
share of its health system financing since 1995.62 In other words, although donor money has 
been pouring into the health system -  “there is a ton of money floating around 
Cambodia,”63 remarked one interviewee -  the Cambodian government has been spending 
less and less on healthcare every year. This suggests that aid is being seriously mismanaged, 
and that the Cambodian government is not making its health system a priority. Since health 
outcomes have in fact been improving,64 it also implies that an entity other than the MoH is 
providing the majority of Cambodian healthcare.  
Overall, the budget allocation to provide healthcare in Cambodia is far too low to 
adequately meet the population’s needs and its downward trend is not encouraging. 
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Cambodia is a country facing significant challenges to provision of adequate 
healthcare in their public sector: the system is underfunded, short of personnel, and has a 
strongly ingrained patronage system that obstructs quality, efficiency, and regulation. It is 
these shortages - and the increasing market demand for adequate healthcare provision - that 
has led to the prominent roles played by INGOs and the private sector. The question then 






III. International Non-Governmental Organizations 
 
Definitional 
 When the term “NGO” is used it refers to all forms of NGOs, those that originated 
in the country they provide services in and those that originated in a foreign country. NGOs 
that work in the country they were formed in, and are concerned with issues within that 
country, are termed “LNGOs” (local non-governmental organizations). NGOs that were 
formed in a different country are called “INGOs” (international non-governmental 
organizations). This describes organizations that were founded in one country, but have 
projects in many other countries. Often, INGOs create local offices in the country they 
operate in, but they remain internationally based because their management is overseen by 
the foreign parent organization.  
While both LNGOs and INGOs are active in Cambodia, our work is focused on the 
mechanisms and effects of INGOs. In Cambodia, most LNGOs work under INGOs as care 
providers and receive their funding from them; according to the Cooperation Committee for 
Cambodia (CCC), which coordinates NGOs in the country, “about 85% of local 
organizations in the country are receiving funding support from the international 
NGO(s).”65 Thus they are generally unable to sway policy on their own. INGOs, in turn, are 
funded by even larger multinational organizations such as the World Bank and United 
Nations.66 It is also important to note that we define INGOs as their own pillar within 
Cambodia’s health system. This is in contrast with other literature that places NGOs as a 
subcategory of the private sector. For our work we draw a line between NGOs and private 
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sector providers, with the distinction being that NGOs are not-for-profit while private care 
providers are for-profit. They are also not public entities; although Cambodian INGOs 
contribute to government funding and programs, they are not publically controlled. INGOs 
in our perspective are part of the so-called third sector- or civil society sector- and have a 
specific and unique function in society. INGOs are an entirely separate pillar in the health 
system that provides care and drives policy. The only other actor that does not fit neatly into 
the public, private, and INGO sectors, are the United Nations and other similar 
organizations that are technically INGOs, but are uniquely supranational and multilateral. 
These will be referred to separately when needed.  
INGO Proliferation 
 The global proliferation of INGOs is not accidental. There are many benefits to 
INGOs that have led to their being a cornerstone of international development policy. In 
theory, INGOs are more accountable funding recipients than governments considering the 
high incidence of public graft. The US certainly takes this view; in Cambodia, USAID 
refuses to deliver aid through the government at all and instead works only with civil society 
organizations.67 Many other countries and international aid organizations also have this 
policy. 
Even if developing countries’ governments were fully funneling aid to its intended 
purpose, civil society organizations may be more efficient regardless. After all, these 
organizations are often focused on one issue that they have both passion for and experience 
with. If the government lacks the infrastructure or background to tackle a complex issue, 
                                                






civil society organizations may be more suited to providing services quickly, efficiently, and 
equitably. 
Furthermore, from an economic standpoint, in countries with low investment, as 
developing countries often have, it is perfectly logical for foreign funders to temporarily fill 
this gap by partnering with INGOs until the government can establish itself enough to take 
over projects. In economics, this is known as dynamic gains and hinges on the idea that 
short-term solutions can allow long-term progress to take place.68 And, morally, it makes 
sense that funders from developed countries would offer their technical experience until 
their developing neighbors can build capacity themselves. In this view, foreign aid channeled 
through civil society organizations is absolutely legitimate in order to sidestep corruption, 
enjoy increased efficiency, and ultimately transfer technology and knowledge to other 
countries.  
 The key assumption in this view is that INGO involvement is temporary. Ideally, these 
organizations enter a developing country, provide training, attract funding, set up systems 
and infrastructure, then phase out and allow locals to maintain it. A representative from 
Maryknoll Cambodia,69 an NGO/International Catholic Mission Movement, described their 
philosophy on the permanence of NGO missions as, “We go where we’re needed, but not 
wanted and leave when we’re wanted, but not needed.”70 INGOs are intended to facilitate 
technology, knowledge, and capacity transfer, then leave the developing country to build on 
that foundation. Their neutrality in politically charged and kleptocratic countries is a benefit, 
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and they often have the international backing of powerful countries to provide monitoring 
and enforcement. From this theoretical perspective, INGOs are a hugely positive addition to 
any developing country - they provide support and transfer capacity that quicken countries’ 
progress to stability and self-sufficiency. Indeed, INGOs are a vital part of any well-
functioning society. 
 In Cambodia, INGOs have certainly been relied upon as a solution to the low public 
health capacity discussed in the previous chapter - and can unquestionably be considered 
one of the pillars of the health system along with private and public providers. The Ministry 
of Health has purposefully outsourced healthcare to INGOs in a process known as 
contracting, which has led to an abundance of INGOs in the country.71 Between 1997 and 
1998, the MoH solicited bids from organizations in order to grant contracts for healthcare 
provision since the government was unable to provide healthcare itself.72 These contracts 
were defined as “a complete service delivery contract whereby the contractors have absolute 
responsibility for service delivery;” all awardees in the system were INGOs.73 The profusion 
of INGOs in Cambodia was also helped along by the period in the early 1990s when 
UNTAC managed the country; the presence of an international organization in the country’s 
early period of development certainly facilitated and encouraged other INGOs to establish 
operations there. The number of INGOs in Cambodia has only grown since: currently, as 
previously mentioned, the US Library of Congress estimates that there are 5,000 registered 
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NGOs in Cambodia.74 This translates to the second most NGOs per capita in the world. 
Overall, due to Cambodia’s history and the policies implemented by its MoH, INGOs are a 
cornerstone of the Cambodian healthcare system. As one interviewee put it, “We just did 
their job for them.”75 Indeed, in 2012 alone NGOs and other donors spent $209 million on 
Cambodian healthcare provision, more than the MoH itself.76 
Funding 
INGOs are, in our definition, not for profit. As such, they rely on external funding 
to finance their operations. These generally come from two sources: private donations and 
public grants.  
A large portion of INGOs’ budget is from private citizen’s personal donations. For 
example, World Renew77 - a religious INGO active in Cambodia- received 66% of its 
funding (over $23 million) from private sources between July 2015 and June 2016.78 
Similarly, Save the Children- another INGO active in Cambodia- received 43% of its 2015 
operating budget from private gifts.79 Thus, it follows that INGOs put a large portion of 
their time and energy into securing these donations. In order to attract donations, INGOs 
must appeal to the public and market their “product” - their vision of humanitarian 
development and aid, and the process they plan to implement - to those who might donate.  
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A second and substantial portion of INGO funding is secured through grants 
provided by governments and other larger INGOs.80 The former is generally the foreign aid 
branch of governments - such as USAID, and the latter is generally large multinational 
INGOs such as the United Nations or the Global Fund. INGOs write proposals to win 
these grants for specific projects or initiatives, and are generally in competition with other 
INGOs to win them.81 According to one INGO employee, this competition has increased in 
recent years: “It used to be [that] we would submit kind of mediocre proposals and they'd 
still be accepted. Now we really have to hustle. It's very competitive.”82 Looking again at 
World Renew and Save the Children: the former received 33% of their 2015 budget from 
grants from a variety of sources,83 while the latter received 36% of theirs from US 
government grants alone.84  
 Considering the resources required to attract private donations and apply to grants, it 
is unsurprising that INGOs have increasingly turned to creative sources to maintain their 
financing. This is evident in the rise of “corporatization”85 and social enterprise in INGOs. 
Corporatization refers to INGOs raising money by selling goods or services in the private 
sector. Social enterprise is a specific type of corporatization where NGOs sell products or 
services in the name of some social issue.86 In Cambodia, the prime example of social 
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enterprise is Population Services Khmer (PSK),87 an NGO that sells family planning goods, 
such as condoms, at discounted prices.88 Indeed, one interviewee described the organization 
as “the world’s biggest condom supplier.”89 Originally an INGO - a local office of the global 
organization Population Services International (PSI) - PSK gradually became fully locally 
managed.90 Without its parent’s funding, PSK turned to social enterprise to support itself.91 
PSK’s move to social enterprise is relevant to Cambodia in general because its income status 
has recently increased from low to lower middle income (as per the World Bank’s 
designation).92 This has led many international donors to move away from Cambodia to 
more subjectively “needy” countries- namely Myanmar- where they believe they can do more 
good.93 In an interview with DFAT, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade for 
Australia, the conflict caused by this increase in income status was described to us: “So we're 
sort of concerned that you're a victim of your own success in the region and that resources 
are reducing when there's still threats. The risk is still there. How will these countries finance 
to respond when required?”94 As funding shifts away, more and more organizations find 
themselves in PSK’s position - in need of funding and willing to get creative in order to 
secure it, sometimes through corporatization. This movement towards social enterprise and 
corporatization is of interest because there is neither a formal legal basis nor monitoring 
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institutions in place to ensure that INGOs are maintaining their accountability.95 Indeed, 
research suggests that the rise in corporatization is simply a rise in INGO corruption96- an 
issue that will be addressed more fully below in the regulation portion of this chapter. We 
will further discuss how the need for funding decreases INGO accountability in the 
micromarket section of chapter six. 
Regulation and Accountability 
Most regulations surrounding NGOs have to do with tax-exemption status and 
financial accountability.97 The United States and other well-developed capitalist democracies 
generally have strict tax laws for non-profits,98 but many developing countries are far less 
well-regulated.99 Countries that do have regulations on the books often lack the resources for 
monitoring and enforcement.100 Cambodia certainly falls under the latter category: the Law 
on Associations and Non-Governmental Organizations (LANGO) was passed in 2015,101 
but Cambodia lacks the ability to successfully monitor its massive and largely autonomous 
INGO sector.102   
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Where there are loopholes, INGOs have been known to take advantage. In 
authoritarian countries, NGOs are able to sidestep regulation if they publicly support the 
ruling party, which leads to the proliferation of bribery.103 In countries where governments 
have put caps on the amount of foreign aid allowed, NGOs have become increasingly 
corporate to raise their own funds, a process discussed above, which the literature has shown 
leads to inefficiency and conflicts of interest.104 In general, although NGOs were initially 
lauded as more accountable and effective funding recipients than developing governments 
there is next to no empirical evidence to support this.105 On the contrary there has been a 
sharp upswing in corruption scandals among NGOs that has increased experts’ concerns 
about NGO accountability.106 Case studies have shown significant fraud, corruption, and 
fund mismanagement on the part of NGOs.107 Indeed, the literature is firm that an increase 
in foreign funding to NGOs leads to less downward accountability to the group of people 
they intend to help.108 Perhaps most strikingly, Aldashev finds that as the number of NGOs 
increase in a country it leads to increased inefficiency, diversion of funds, and less 
downwardly accountable organizations.109  
To date, there has been only one scandal concerning INGO mismanagement in 
Cambodia that we are aware of. The organization in question, MEDiCAM, allegedly “triple 
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billed people” and stole “four hundred and something thousand dollars” from their malaria 
program funding, and was shut down shortly after.110 Regardless, the extremely high density 
of INGOs in Cambodia, along with their autonomy and power in the health sector, make 
their accountability vital and effective regulation imperative.  
 
  
                                                







 Private healthcare in Cambodia is provided primarily through for-profit clinics, 
hospitals not under the purview of the government, and small practices run by individual 
physicians. For the purpose of this paper, pharmacies and other smaller non-registered 
healthcare providers will not be included in the definition of private healthcare provision. In 
Cambodia, there is a rapidly growing, though loosely regulated, private sector with more 
than 5,500 licensed providers which deliver a large proportion of health services. This 
growing private medical sector is the point of first contact for the majority of the sick and 
injured population.111 Despite the large contributions of INGO and donor government 
funding to public healthcare, the Center for Social Development found that “many citizens 
prefer to consult private (92% contact rate) rather than public (31% contact rate) health care 
providers.”112 In other words, 92% of those seeking medical care choose to interact with 
private providers. Evidence suggests that the private professional healthcare sector is now 
larger than the public healthcare sector in some regions of Cambodia. In the province of 
Kampong Cham, for example, there is a base of 153 private facilities. In comparison, public 
sector services are provided from 141 facilities. This is of particular significance because the 
province has the largest population base in the country.113 The sheer size of the Cambodian 
                                                
111 Annear et. al, “The Kingdom of Cambodia Health System Review,” xxiv. 
112 “Living Under the Rule of Corruption: An Analysis of Everyday Forms of Corrupt Practice in 
Cambodia,” Center for Social Development 3 (February 2005): 28.  
113 Sann Chan Soeng, Jeremy Grundy, Cheng Morn, and Chham Samnang, “Evaluation of Immunization 
Knowledge, Practices, and Service-delivery in the Private Sector in Cambodia,” Journal of Health, 




private sector - both formal (hospitals and clinics) and informal (clinic “shops” and 
individual doctors) - is shown in the figure below:  
 
(Figure 7: Source of healthcare by income quintile.)114  
Almost 80% of Cambodians are seeking healthcare in the private sector - a percentage 
similar to Indonesia, but significantly smaller than in the Philippines or Vietnam.  
Public-Private Partnerships 
Cambodia is one of many countries in the world using privatization as a solution to 
fill the gaps in capacity of public healthcare. Sekhri and Feachem define the motivation 
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behind working with the private sector in their study of the efficacy of privatization, “the 
goal of any partnership with the private sector is to actively enlist private capital, both 
human and financial, to help governments fulfill their responsibilities for providing equitable 
access to high-quality services.”115 We use this statement to identify three goals for an 
effective partnership between public and private healthcare: first, creating dynamic gains for 
long-term public capacity, second, providing equitable access to healthcare, and third, 
providing high-quality care. Each of these points will be addressed in the argumentative 
portion of our thesis.  
 Process of Privatization  
 Privatization within the healthcare system is a growing global phenomenon - both 
due to independent market demand and contracted public-private partnerships. Its growth as 
a sector has been controversial, with supporters hailing it as the solution to weak, 
unresponsive, and resource-starved healthcare systems, and opponents shying away from its 
for-profit and often under-regulated nature. 
Studies in favor of privatization focus on the possible increased patient-centredness 
and responsiveness of the private sector, in addition to proposing that it could produce 
better results at a lower overall cost. The literature also demonstrates that patient wait times 
are significantly lower in the private system.116 The improvement in both patient treatment 
and access to care, according to proponents, is especially important in underrepresented 
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rural areas and where privatization can increase the number of healthcare providers 
exponentially.  
Opponents, however, cite the steep costs that could be associated with increased 
private healthcare provision. Among these costs are brain drain, as public sector workers 
move to the private sector due to low wages or choose to participate in physician dual 
practice - risking lowering their working hours in public hospitals.117 In addition, it is 
possible that the private sector increases the inequity of access because it favors those who 
can afford treatment at the for-profit organizations.118 These arguments will be expanded 
upon later in our paper. This literature argues against the lower costs argument, citing 
evidence that private participation in healthcare is actually associated with higher 
expenditure. For example, Lebanon has one of the most privatized health systems in the 
developing world, but it spends more than twice as much as Sri Lanka on healthcare, and yet 
its infant and maternal mortality rates are 2.5 and 3 times higher respectively.119 Additionally, 
the difficulty of managing and regulating private providers creates inefficiencies, especially 
where government capacity is weak and there are too few private provider organizations to 
ensure price competition. This is demonstrated by the contracting process in Cambodia, 
where the low number of technically acceptable bids received in one of its largest schemes to 
contract out healthcare meant that in many cases contracts were awarded without 
competition -  even when the overall size of the program was reduced by 40%. After this 
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process, private providers were found to have lower operating costs in only 20 percent of 
contracting programs for which data is available.120 The low competition in the contracting 
bids means that the private organizations involved maintained negotiation leverage over the 
MoH and, accordingly, have little regulation or national management. 
Regulation  
The literature, although lacking in uniformity in most areas, shares one consensus: 
under-regulated private sectors can be dangerous and counterproductive - leading to 
overprescription of corticosteroids, incomplete courses of antibiotics, unnecessary and 
expensive surgical procedures, dangerous prescriptions of conflicting medications, and 
uninformed health advice - particularly in the area of family planning.121 Although these risks 
are present in all health sectors, their prevalence and degree are exacerbated in private 
sectors that have little oversight and accountability, a situation that is certainly the current 
case in Cambodia.  
Although regulation of private healthcare remains low - and difficult to enforce, as 
will be discussed in the Dual Practice section of the paper- steps forward have been made in 
recent years by the Cambodian government. The Royal Government of Cambodia enacted 
legislation in its Law on the Management of Private Medical, Paramedical and Medical Aid Services 
(2000), which stipulates the conditions under which private-sector providers can operate and 
identifies the roles and responsibilities of MoH for monitoring pharmaceutical practice and 
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imports, including vaccines.122 Much of this legislation passed due to the identification by the 
MoH of private-public partnerships as integral to Cambodia’s development in its Health 
Sector Strategic Plan. Due to low enforcement ability, however, there continues to be little 
oversight of private sector healthcare facilities. The registration of all private medical 
facilities and practices was made mandatory under a law adopted in late 2000, though the 
resources available for effectively monitoring are limited and this has so far done little to 
prevent the fact that in rural areas private non-medical (unqualified and unregistered) 
providers account for half of all health-care providers.123 In fact, this number may be an 
underestimate given the tactics used by the Cambodian government in their survey 
measures. As described in our interviews, “They'll [the Cambodian government] say ‘a 
hundred percent of...illegal pharmacies...have been shut down.’ What they're really saying is 
‘100 percent of illegal pharmacies that are not managed by Ministry of Health staff have 
been shut down.”124 This reflects the firmly entrenched patronage system present in 
Cambodian healthcare - a system we will expound upon in the following section.  
This lack of regulation, and inability to enforce existing regulation, are significant due 
to the size of the private sector in Cambodia; the sector is not functioning as a secondary 
provider of care in Cambodia, but rather as a primary contact point for many people seeking 
healthcare. Thus, the dangerous healthcare practices that result from poor regulation directly 
affect broad swaths of the Cambodian population.  
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V. Effects on Public Sector Capacity 
 
Introduction  
Outsourcing to INGOs and assumption by the private sector have effects on the 
capacity of the public sector. Although the intention is to give the state time to build its 
infrastructure while meeting health needs, we argue that both sectors are instead creating 
competition for the public sector through brain and resource drain. The former is the 
movement of skilled workers from the public sector into the other two sectors, and the latter 
is the channeling of funding and other resources to the other sectors rather than to the 
public sector. Overall, both processes reduce the human and physical capital of the public 
sector and leave it weaker than before the outsourcing and assumption occurred. We will 
begin by discussing the mechanics of brain drain, then will discuss resource drain.  
Brain Drain 
Dual Practice  
The first mechanism that drains qualified individuals from the public sector is the 
existence of dual practitioners, defined as “physicians employed in public hospitals who also 
work in other types of health services, including ambulant emergency care where they 
substitute for private GPs (moonlighting), private not-for-profit hospitals or private for-
profit hospitals and other providers.”125 The exact number of public health staff in dual 
practice is unknown, but has been estimated at two-thirds of the public workforce.126 Of 
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those involved, MoH employees constitute the largest proportion of health workers 
employed in the for-profit private sector, either as independent workers (self-employed 
private practitioners) or employees of nongovernmental health services.127 This demonstrates 
that a large sector of the private sector’s workforce is pulled directly from the public health 
system. 
Given the opportunities in the private sector, why do some health workers go to 
great lengths to remain a part of the public sector? Recall that physicians entering the health 
system in Cambodia after graduation from medical school often pay to enter the public 
system, a common bribing practice in all government job areas for hiring and promotion.128 
By paying to work in the public sector, the physicians increase their chances of being able to 
receive a private practitioner's license and protect their private practices from government 
oversight. An employee at the University Research Company (URC) who works closely with 
the public health sector explains, “in effect purchasing your way into the Ministry of Health 
is purchasing the right to set up a dual practice.”129 Recently, however, a growing number of 
medical graduates never enter government service, indicating the expanding role and power 
of the private sector.130 In addition to growing influence, employment in the private sector is 
desirable due to the increased wage opportunities - particularly for specialists. The average 
base salary (including allowances) for a government health professional is only about $100 
per month, with doctors and specialists earning only 50% more than the average. Thus, for 
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many doctors dual practice, principally home visits and private clinics, is still the main source 
of income for specialists and medical doctors. Income from these practices average between 
$50 and $350 per month.131  
Although not inherently negative, studies have found physician dual practice to be 
concerning due to the threat of reducing the work supply in the public sector and the 
possible conflicts of interest for doctors who may be competing for their own patients 
between sectors.132 These risks are limited in countries that have the capacity to restrict the 
opportunities for dual practitioners to prioritize income and benefits over their responsibility 
to the public - an example being the integrated partnership success in the Norwegian 
system133 - but this capacity is often lacking in lower and middle income countries.134 This is 
exemplified by the fact that even in one of the most effective ministerial departments in the 
Cambodian MoH, out of around 15 staff  “only four or five actually work; the remaining 
simply showed their face, donated a portion of their salary to their head of department and 
pursued private activities.”135 This phenomenon is exemplified by the Cambodian youth and 
sports ministry, described to us in our interviews, “two buildings over is a classic french 
ministry - youth and sports. And, as far as I can tell, I mean, about once a week the parking 
lot is completely full. The whole rest of the week the parking lot has five cars in it. And there 
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must be 400 to 500 employees in the building in theory.”136 Essentially, physicians who wish 
to work in the private sector must pay a one-time bribe to enter the MoH in order to pave 
the way for receiving a private care license, and then must pay continuing bribes to the heads 
of their departments to ignore that they are working the majority of their hours outside of 
the public sector.   
The Cambodian government’s failure to regulate dual practice is therefore 
exacerbated by the extensive connections that exist between the public and private 
healthcare systems. Due to the system described above, dual practice creates ties between the 
government and private practices, as the two sectors now share employees and are co-
sources of income. The heads of department receive portions of the employee salaries only 
so long as those employees are successfully pursuing work in the private sector. This 
effectively prevents private sector regulations from being passed, because the dual 
employment of many public health officials in the private sector creates a conflict of interest 
for the government in regulating private sector activities. In our interview with URC, it was 
stated that, “the government doesn't regulate- and has no appetite to regulate- the private 
sector because it doesn't want to upset its own staff in the afternoons! The private sector is 
the same people in different premises.137 And they actually do regulate the few private 
practices that are not dual practice.”138 Thus, in order to have a successful - and less 
monitored - practice, doctors must participate in the bribing and patronage system.139 This 
cycle of employment is perpetuated as low wages and fear of corruption in the public sector 
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drive many educated and high-skilled individuals to seek work in the other sectors, leaving 
less qualified individuals in positions of power and influence in the government, further 
retarding the ability of the government to design and implement effective healthcare policies 
and regulations.  
In summary, a large portion of Cambodia’s public health workers are being pulled 
into the private sector, which not only drains the public system of workers but also 
perpetuates a cycle of patronage.  
Salaries and Benefits in INGOs 
A second avenue for brain drain from the public sector is due to healthcare 
professionals’ preference for employment in INGOs. This is largely because of salary 
differences: positions with INGOs pay much better than equivalent positions in the MoH. 
Public healthcare professionals in Cambodia are paid as civil servants,140 with an average 
monthly salary of $60 in 2011.141 By 2015, this had risen slightly to $100 per month, 
including all allowances, and was only $50 higher for doctors.142 According to one 
interviewee, “You can be a very experienced doctor and you'll still get 200 dollars 
maximum.”143 This salary is not sufficient to cover living costs, and as such Chhea notes in 
her study that “all staff had second jobs. This was not unusual... most health workers in 
Cambodia had at least one private source of income.”144 
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In contrast, in 2009 (two years before Chhea’s $60 per month figure), The 
Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC)145 noted that medium sized INGOs were 
paying their entry level local employees an average of $137 per month.146 Although this 
number is for INGOs in all sectors, considering public health professionals are paid as 
general civil servants by the MoH, the numbers are roughly comparable. It is also important 
to note that the figure noted for government employees includes all allowances, while the 
INGO figure does not. With quantifiable benefits included, the INGO per month salary in 
2009 was approximately $163 (again, compared to $60 per month for public civil servants 
two years later).147  
In general, INGOs have a much deeper pool of resources available with which to 
pay their employees. According to the Cambodian National Health Accounts, in 2012 the 
government spent approximately $37 million on employee compensation while NGOs and 
other donors spent nearly $57 million - one and a half times as much- on the same.148 
Moreover, the entire Cambodian MoH’s expenditure in 2012 was roughly $200 million,149 
while Save the Children (just one of the INGOs active in Cambodia’s health sector) had 
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$600 million in revenue in the same year.150 Granted, Save the Children’s revenue is spread 
across multiple countries, but the fact that just one of the 5,000 NGOs in Cambodia had an 
operating budget three times that of the MoH is still telling. In short, INGOs can provide 
attractive salaries to Cambodian medical professionals and have the resources to continue to 
do so, making them stiff competition for the MoH.  
The intangible benefits of INGOs are also a crucial aspect of health professionals’ 
decision to work for them rather than for the public sector. Advancement is far easier and 
more equitable in INGOs; those uninterested in playing the patronage and bribery game can 
advance within an INGO based on merit. As told to us by one locally hired INGO 
employee, in order to be promoted in the government you must be “involved in politics,”151 
in other words, have connections with high ranking public officials. He found that this was 
not the case in INGOs.152 Considering that higher level employees in INGOs were paid an 
average of $676 per month in 2009,153 opportunities for advancement are not incidental.  
Comparatively, in a 2015 public health systems report, the lack of rewards for 
professional achievement and provision of career development opportunities was stressed.154 
Moreover, the incentive schemes that exist are “fragmented and not adequately linked to 
performance.”155 These performance incentives are inconsistent across all health facilities 
                                                
150 Internal Revenue Service, Save the Children’s 2012 990 Form, 
http://www.savethechildren.org/atf/cf/%7B9def2ebe-10ae-432c-9bd0-
df91d2eba74a%7D/2_STC_990_2012.PDF. 
151 Interview with World Renew, August 10, 2016. 
152 Interview with World Renew, August 10, 2016. 
153 Cooperation Committee of Cambodia, Survey of Salaries and Benefits for National Staff of 
International and Cambodian NGOs, 31. 
154 Annear et. al, “The Kingdom of Cambodia Health System Review,” 76. 




and the criteria to receive an incentive is generally unclear to employees.156 Most important, 
“staff… perceive the criteria to be unfair or not based on their own performance.”157 In 
short, dedicated workers find that their efforts are more rewarded in the INGO sector, and 
they can advance based on merit alone. This is especially attractive to well-educated 
Cambodians who, despite their qualifications, cannot afford to pay the bribe to work in the 
government.  
Furthermore, INGOs generally offer better healthcare, paid leave, life insurance, and 
other benefits to their employees. In CCC’s 2009 report, they note that INGO employees 
generally receive annual leave, sick days, maternity and paternity leave, wedding leave, 
accident insurance, disability insurance, severance pay, paid overtime, and salary advances, 
among other benefits.158 These benefits are expected in INGOs since they operate in a 
Western system that has enforced standards for employee rights. As INGOs are part of an 
international labor market, both the wages and benefits they offer their employees must 
adhere to global standards - this is especially true if they rely on foreign funding to operate. 
The MoH is far from having the infrastructure to provide a similar benefit package to its 
employees.159 Also, if Cambodians are interested in leaving the country, some INGOs offer 
relocation benefits, which places employees in sister organizations in other countries.160 
Finally, the environment in INGOs is often a draw in and of itself - employees are with 
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international colleagues, are gaining high level skills, and are enjoying other intangible 
benefits of working for a large, international organization.  
 Overall, the combined allure of higher salaries and better benefits draws many health 
professionals to work for INGOs rather than for the Cambodian government. The 2015 
Cambodian Health System Review notes that “... there is a noticeable movement of staff from 
[public] civil-service to higher-paid international and private-sector positions (internal brain 
drain).”161 Furthermore, an increasing number of medical graduates do not enter the public 
sector in the first place, preferring to work immediately in the INGO or private sector.162  
 Brain drain from the public to INGO sector is problematic in Cambodia because the 
public health system cannot afford to lose health professionals. As discussed in the chapter 
outlining Cambodia’s public health system, the MoH currently employs 19,457 civil servants 
in the health sector, only 14% of which are doctors, meaning there are approximately 2,723 
publicly employed doctors in the whole of the country.163 As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
two-thirds of those 2,723 doctors are dually employed in the private sector164 and thus barely 
present as public providers, so the effective number of doctors is even lower. To put these 
figures in perspective, in order to meet WHO standards for the health worker-to-population 
ratio Cambodia will need a public health workforce of 32,000 in the next three years.165 
Furthermore, this notable shortage of medical professionals does not appear to be 
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improving as few Cambodians are graduating medical school (less than 80 in 2009).166 Thus 
the drain of skilled workers is debilitating for the already short staffed public health system 
and has certainly contributed to its continued lack of capacity.  
The movement of health professionals from the government into the INGO sector 
has negative impacts beyond the immediate decrease in skilled labor, namely in relation to 
long-term effects on regulation. This is partially the case because the bribery and patronage 
system is not merit based, and those who rise to positions of power may be ill-equipped to 
create policy. With fewer qualified people in government, and an increased ratio of those 
there due to patronage, strong and effective regulation of health provision is less likely to be 
implemented. Furthermore, the public sector is unlikely to hire more qualified individuals as 
it is not in their self-interest to dismantle a system they profit from. This poor outlook for 
health regulation is concerning for government health infrastructure in general, and the 
incidence of dual practice particularly. If publicly provided healthcare continues to operate at 
a low level of quality, more patients will prefer to seek treatment at private hospitals. 
Simultaneously, weak regulation allows private practitioners to continue profiting from low 
quality private care. In this two-pronged mechanism, officials profiting from Cambodians’ 
use of private facilities benefit from weak regulation because it both drives patients away 
from the public sector and into the private sector. Thus, the migration of educated and 
skilled health professionals to the INGO sector perpetuates a self-reinforcing cycle where 
those in power in the MoH have few incentives to constrain their behavior and thereby 
increasingly drive away those most able - and likely - to improve the system.  
                                                
166 Midterm Review of the Health Workforce Development, DFAT (2011). Found in Annear et. al, “The 




In summary, brain drain from the MoH into the private sector via dual practice, and 
into the INGO sector- due to the latter’s more attractive salaries, benefits, and work 
environment- weakens the human capacity of the public health system. Without skilled 
medical professionals, the public sector has less capacity with each passing year. 
Furthermore, in the longer term, as the MoH hollows out, incentives to create effective 
regulation are decreased, suggesting worse quality of care as a result. 
Resource Drain 
 We will now move on to discuss the second mechanism weakening the capacity of 
the Cambodian public health system: resource drain. This refers to the channeling of funding 
and other resources to the private and INGO sectors rather than to the public sector. 
Contracting and the Cambodian Public’s Health Spending 
The first mechanism that drains resources from the public healthcare system is the 
increased prominence of the private sector in primary healthcare provision. This resource 
drain from the public to the private occurs in two primary ways. First, over time the 
expansion of the private sector and the perception that it provides higher quality care has led 
to the private sector receiving the vast majority of individuals’ health spending. Secondly, in 
response to its historical lack of infrastructure - particularly in rural regions - the government 
has contracted private practitioners to fill the gaps in its capacity. This implies that the 
government continues to divert a large proportion of its own funding to developing the 





The growth of the private sector and the corresponding increase in patients choosing 
to seek care outside of the public sector is significant because health system user fees 
generate the largest percentage of public health sector incomes (see figure below). 
 
(Figure 8: Payment for health services by type of facility - in percent of total income.)167 
Therefore, as there is a limited supply of patients and demand for healthcare, by pulling 
patients from the public sector, the private sector is directly impacting the public sector’s 
income and resources. This becomes even more evident as the private sector grows. 
Although outpatient consultation rates in the public sector have increased, the use of 
licensed and unlicensed providers in the private sector has grown even faster. The difference 
in utilization growth between the public and private health sectors is striking. In 2000 21.9% 
of those first seeking treatment sought it in the public sector, while 38.5% sought it in the 
private sector. By 2005, utilization of the public sector grew to 24.4% and utilization of the 
                                                




private sector grew to be 51.7%.168 Therefore, over the course of five years the public sector 
grew less than 3% in comparison with over 27% growth of the private sector. It is estimated 
that about two-thirds of care episodes now take place in the private sector.169 According to 
the Health Service Delivery Profile developed by the WHO in conjunction with the MoH, 
“Cambodia has one of the largest shares of out-of-pocket payments in the Western Pacific 
Region.”170 Currently, the majority of those out-of-pocket payments (68%) go to private 
medical services, while only 18.5% are spent in the public sector.171  
Secondly, the Cambodian government began piloting the external contracting model 
of service delivery in 1999.172 This strategy built on the foundation of public–private 
partnerships in health service management by contracting INGOs and private facilities 
through the MoH, primarily to address three main issues: decentralization to rural regions 
with low access to healthcare, the use of regulated markets rather than unregulated and 
dangerous “small providers,” and finally, harnessing the emergence of private sector and 
civil society.173 For example, the MoH contracted INGOs to manage the delivery of health 
services by public health providers in five Operating Districts.174 While paying the other 
sectors to manage health was intended to improve and supplement government provided 
services, it has ended up being that the other sectors control and implement all services in 
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the contracted regions. This is mainly an issue due to the fact that there is still no regulation 
of prices or quality of private healthcare.175  
In conclusion, resource drain from the MoH into the private sector, caused by the 
perception that it provides higher quality care and the growing number of regions placed 
under private partnerships, has led to the private sector receiving the vast majority of 
individual health spending. This demonstrates that the government is continuing to divert a 
large proportion of its own, steadily decreasing, funding to developing the private provision 
of healthcare, rather than using the available resources to rebuild public infrastructure. 
International Funding 
 A second mechanism draining available resources from the Cambodian government 
is via the INGO sector. This occurs largely due to the perception that INGOs are better aid 
recipients than developing governments. USAID, for example, has a policy to funnel aid 
almost exclusively through INGOs.176 Considering the demonstrated inefficiency, graft, and 
weak infrastructure in the Cambodian government, this policy is unsurprising. Many other 
major donors are of the same mind. Beyond simple redirection of funds to INGOs rather 
than developing governments, the two also directly compete for the same grants from 
supranational groups - such as the UN- and government aid departments- such as DFAT. 
Due to INGOs’ specialization in development, superior efficiency, and reputation for 
accountability, we expect that they are generally more successful at winning these grants. 
Indeed, according to one INGO employee, of most INGOs’ donors “80% … gave them 
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$5,000. And USAID gave them 120 million, and Gates gave them 40 million.”177 Because the 
pool of development funding is inherently limited, if aid is funneled through INGOs rather 
than the Cambodian government - as a direct policy or indirectly through the allocation of 
grants - INGOs get more of the pie and developing governments get less. Thus, 
development aid has increasingly been in the hands of INGOs rather than the Cambodian 
government.178  
 Indeed, the data support this narrative. According to the WHO, between 2008 and 
2009, external resources as a percent of government health expenditure decreased from 62% 
to 42%.179 This means that far less of the MoH’s expenditure on health came from foreign 
aid. We would expect this trend to indicate that the Cambodian government was 
simultaneously increasing its share of the health expenditure burden in order to maintain the 
same level of resources in the health sector as previously existed. This does not, however, 
appear to be the case. The figure below indicates that health expenditure as a percentage of 
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total government expenditure has decreased to 6.1%.180 This implies that the decrease in 
foreign aid to the MoH is not being offset by an increase in government spending on health. 
It is significant that the Cambodian government is not increasing its budget allocation for 
healthcare because it suggests that the government is comfortable allowing aid to flow to 
other entities, thereby decreasing its influence in the health sector. 
The figure also indicates that ODA has increased over the same time period, but 
because the percentage of that ODA that flows through the government has decreased 
(from 62% to 42%, as stated above), this indicates that ODA is being channeled to other 
recipients within Cambodia rather than the MoH. In other words, of the pool of ODA, less 
is being funneled through the MoH and donors are instead circumventing the government 
and funding other care providers.  
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(Figure 9: Health expenditure as a percentage of government expenditure compared to ODA from 2000 to 
2014.)181182 
The data on private expenditure further support this, as private health spending has 
been increasing. By 2014, 78% of total health expenditure was from private sources - an 
increase of over 10% in less than a decade.183 This means that the lion’s share of health 
financing is coming from sources outside the Cambodian government: INGOS, private 
citizens and donors, etc. Many are quick to assert that out-of-pocket health expenditure by 
Cambodians is decreasing, and this is true.184 But this merely implies that while health 
expenditure by households has decreased, private expenditure by outside sources has been rapidly 
increasing. In other words, in the pie of health expenditure, the government’s share has been 
decreasing, households’ share has been decreasing, and the percentage expended by outside 
private sources has massively increased. This means that rather than channel aid through the 
MoH, donors are instead heaping aid onto other sectors - which are then providing funding 
for the majority of Cambodian healthcare. The reality that health financing is being taken 
over by non-public entities is often obscured when Cambodian health expenditure data are 
presented, as the increase in total health expenditure is most often remarked upon - a 
descriptor that includes spending by all sources. This misdirects from the fact that the 
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government’s share of total health expenditure is actually decreasing and that donors are 
increasingly declining to direct aid through the MoH.  
 Data from Aidflows puts the magnitude of this INGO funding into perspective as 
compared to Cambodia’s peers. In 2012, 3% of ODA was specifically directed to NGOs in 
Cambodia, or nearly $26 million.185 In comparison, in the same year, Thailand received $4 
million in NGO funding, less than one percent of all ODA it received,186 and Vietnam 
received $27 million, half a percent of its total ODA.187 Laos188 and Sierra Leone189 each 
received approximately $11 million in NGO funding, or 2% of each of their ODA. While 
the funding allocation to Cambodia’s NGO sector is particularly striking, the share of ODA 
to the NGO sector in nearly all of the countries mentioned has increased over time.  
 The view from the donor perspective further reinforces this. According to USAID’s 
Foreign Aid Explorer, in 2012, the US government disbursed $11 million to Cambodia’s 
health sector specifically.190 Of that funding, $7.8 million went directly to URC, the INGO 
that manages the Cambodian Health Equity Fund (Cambodia’s version of “nationally” 
provided healthcare described previously).191 That is to say that the majority of aid the US 
gives to Cambodia is actually going to one - US based - INGO. Furthermore, the aid that the 
MoH does directly receive is often funneled back into INGOs because the government 
outsources much of its healthcare provision to INGOs through various health contracting 
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systems meant to improve capacity, as discussed in the chapter on INGOs. Thus, because 
donors choose to send funding to INGOs directly and because the Cambodian MoH 
chooses to pay INGOs to provide healthcare to its people, INGOs in Cambodia end up 
with the majority of health development aid. Therefore, through the various mechanisms 
discussed, the MoH has very little foreign resources with which to develop their public 
healthcare system.  
 In short, in terms of resources, INGOs are growing and the MoH is shrinking. More 
important, INGOs’ presence in developing countries has directly contributed to this 
diversion of resources away from developing governments. Considering INGOs’ supposed 
efficiency and accountability, their monopoly on funding is not necessarily negative. Indeed, 
it is possible to imagine a solution to Cambodia’s need for provision of healthcare where 
INGOs are the sole provider of services. However, as we will address in the next chapter, 
INGOs are not stable healthcare providers in the long-term. 
Summary 
 Reliance on INGOs and private providers for healthcare services in Cambodia is not 
without effect. On the contrary, outsourcing to INGOs and assumption by the private 
sector lead to brain and resource drain from the public healthcare system. The longer these 
alternative health systems remain in country, the weaker public infrastructure becomes as it 
continually loses personnel and funding. However, replacement of public health systems 
with INGOs and privatization, and the decreases in public capacity it leads to, is not 
inherently problematic. Indeed, these alternative health systems have been used as solutions 




that the de facto replacement of public healthcare by the other two sectors is concerning and 





VI. Implications of INGOs and Privatization 
 
Introduction  
The drain of resources and personnel from the public sector into the INGO and 
private sectors is not inherently problematic. Both outsourcing to INGOs and privatization 
of healthcare have benefits that have led to their becoming healthcare alternatives when 
governments’ systems are insufficient. Indeed, we would like to stress that both INGOs and 
private providers are a vital part of a well-functioning healthcare system. However, there are 
concerning long-term implications of outsourcing to INGOs and assumption by the private 
sector on public health system capacity, especially when they become the sole providers of 
healthcare in a country where regulation is weak. In this chapter, we will discuss why 
outsourcing to INGOs and privatization - and the subsequent decrease in public sector 
capacity from their activities - are damaging trends that deserve more attention from those 
focused on international development.  
Why Not INGOs: the INGO Micromarket and Mission Drift 
         INGOs are not a stable alternative to nationally provided healthcare because they 
operate in their own micromarket. We define the INGO micromarket as the system of 
incentives and constraints to which INGOs are subject in the areas of funding and 
personnel, which uniquely affect their behavior. The micromarket encompasses INGOs’ 
access to funding, methods to attract that funding, use of resources, hiring environment, and 
downward accountability (ability to remain accountable to local communities). Of these 
aspects of the micromarket, one of the most relevant to INGOs’ ability to act as a long-term 




issue is known as mission drift and will be discussed in more depth following the section on 
the micromarket. Although the reality that INGOs have concerns beyond just the 
communities they serve is known, research to date has not adequately addressed the 
implications. We argue that the INGO micromarket - and the secondary issue of mission 
drift - make INGOs a poor sole substitute for state provided healthcare. To make this 
evident we will discuss the definitions of both phenomena, and will then address their 
relevance to long-term healthcare provision. 
INGO Micromarket 
The INGO micromarket is a term we created to refer to a phenomenon we observed 
in our interviews and noted in various literatures, namely the system of incentives, labor and 
funding constraints under which INGOs operate. 
The first supply side constraint INGOs contend with is the need for funding. This is 
affected not only by the inherently limited supply of funds, but also by trends in donor 
concerns and their effect on donor funding behavior. This latter issue is known as fad 
funding.192 Because INGOs must compete with each other for funding and are largely reliant 
on the donor community for that funding, they are sensitive to the interests of their funders. 
For an example of this, recall PSK’s move to social enterprise in order to retain their 
financing from the funding section of chapter three. If the donor community’s attention 
shifts to a new issue - maternal health rather than HIV, for example - INGOs working on 
the now out-dated issue are put in a tight spot. As one INGO employee succinctly said, “the 
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donor funding of NGOs can change overnight.”193 INGOs, then, are beholden to the whims 
of donors. 
This constraint - limited funding that is controlled by a community of funders who 
are influenced by fads - creates perverse incentives for INGOs. Namely, fad funding pushes 
INGOs to either pour resources into remaining attractive to donors or alter their missions to 
remain relevant to the current fad; this latter phenomenon is known as mission drift.194 To 
continue our previous example: if fads change and funding shifts from HIV to maternal 
health, organizations that were focused on HIV can either use their resources to compete 
with other HIV focused organizations for this smaller pool of funding, or can change their 
focus to maternal health where funding is more plentiful and competition is less intense. 
Many choose to alter their missions to follow the funding. Thus, the funding constraint 
incentivizes INGOs to allow their missions to drift from issue to issue. As one INGO 
director described to us, in reference to another organization, “Save the Children are pretty 
good at nutrition but they don’t stick to their knitting, right? They don’t stick to what they 
do. They start chasing money. So you start to get Save the Children doing malaria work.”195 
This flexibility in INGOs’ missions is not inherently problematic if INGOs are operating as 
complementary providers of care, but is concerning if they are sole providers, as we will 
address in the implications section below.  
The second main constraint on INGOs’ behavior is the need for personnel. INGOs 
are not only funneling extensive human and capital resources to secure donations and apply 
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for grants, which requires “considerable staff, board, and volunteer effort, divert[ing] 
attention from other vital functions…,”196 but also into attracting expatriate staff for the 
cause they are focused on at that moment. As organizations move between issues to 
maintain their funding, employees will leave and join organizations based on what issue the 
INGO is currently addressing. That is to say, skilled workers are loyal to causes, not to the 
organizations for which they work. As one long time INGO employee put it, “I'm not sure 
how important for most international NGO [employees] the actual NGO is… I've gone 
where what I'm interested in working on is being funded. And most people in the field do 
that. So while most NGOs will have a few lifers- people who are really committed to that 
NGO- they're rare.” 197 This creates intense competition between INGOs for skilled 
employees, and incentivizes them to offer generous salaries and benefit packages to their 
expatriate staff in order to entice them to their specific organization. Organizations that are 
large enough will create “gigantic incentive structures,” which lead to “wage distortion,” 
according to one of our INGO employee interviewees.198 Highly sought after employees 
thus circulate from INGO to INGO as causes and benefit packages shift, forming a key part 
of the INGO micromarket. 
The restraints on funding and skilled staff complete the complex and insular system 
we have termed the micromarket: funding moves as donor interest does, organizations shift 
issues to stay on top of funding, international employees move between organizations based 
on the issue being addressed, organizations put large amounts of resources into attracting 
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both funding and skilled workers, and the whole micromarket operates across multiple 
countries. In short, INGOs have many concerns drawing their attention and resources other 
than care provision, which affects their effectiveness as a long-term healthcare provider, as 
we will discuss shortly. However, we first turn to a further exploration of mission drift. 
Mission Drift 
As previously mentioned, mission drift describes an effect of INGOs’ dependency 
on external funding to maintain their operations.199 In short, mission drift is when INGOs 
alter their issue focus in order to keep pace with fads in funding.200 This occurs because 
INGOs are beholden to their donors, and must remain relevant to attract funding. In other 
words, if the public’s interest in an issue changes, taking funding with it, the INGO is forced 
to change its area of work in order to maintain its financing. According to Froelich this 
“shifting of priorities to match somewhat faddish funding criteria [is] considered a key failure 
in the treatment and delivery of human services,”201 and as such (unlike the INGO 
micromarket), mission drift and its cause - fad funding - are not issues that we identified and 
defined, but rather have been discussed at length in other literature. 
Because INGOs compete amongst each other for a limited pool of donor resources, 
they must remain attractive to the donor community if they are to receive funding. This is 
true not only of private funds, but also of government grants; put simply, governments will 
not award grant funding to an organization that does work irrelevant to that government’s 
goals, and governments’ goals are often led by public interest. INGOs, then, are reliant on 
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the interests of the public to receive funding, and will change their organization’s mission in 
order to pivot towards issues that are in vogue with possible donors.  An excellent 
illustration of fad funding was provided to us by an executive of URC:  
HIV/AIDS is a good example. There was no money in AIDS. There was 
nothing to do about AIDS, except some pretty shaky preventive stuff, so 
there wasn't much money in it and nobody was particularly interested. 
Through the 90s- to about the mid 90s… And then all of a sudden- I mean 
the Durban 2000 AIDS Conference- HIV activists were successful in 
convincing the world that they should pay for ARVs for poor people… And 
all of a sudden every NGO in the world was interested in AIDS...And all of a 
sudden the world wanted to spend millions and millions of dollars- I mean 
unbelievable amounts of money- on HIV.202  
 
In summary, fad funding in the international aid community leads to INGO mission 
drift. These phenomena are common issues for INGOs, but have implications - along with 
the micromarket in general - for their ability to operate as a sustainable provider of 
healthcare, which we will now discuss. 
Implications of the INGO Micromarket and Mission Drift 
         Both the micromarket in general, and mission drift specifically, make INGOs an 
unstable provider of healthcare in the long-term - especially if they are solely relied upon to 
provide care for a specific health issue. 
We have highlighted mission drift because it has concerning implications for 
INGOs’ stability as a healthcare provider. The tendency for INGOs’ missions to drift 
suggests that as trends change, organizations cannot be relied upon to provide care for the 
same health issue on which they have focused in the past. There can be no assumption that 
INGOs will remain loyal to one issue as funding shifts with Western fads in development 
                                                




aid. An organization that has previously provided HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment, to 
continue our previous example, might find that international concern for the issue has 
decreased, and funding is easier to come by if they work to address maternal health. They 
may then leave the HIV/AIDS sphere of healthcare and enter the maternal health sphere to 
attract this funding. When there are many healthcare providers, one organization leaving an 
issue sphere has less effect, but in Cambodia, and to a lesser extent in other developing 
nations, there are often only one or two providers for each issue sphere and the exit of a 
main care provider has serious implications. Furthermore, INGOs are usually not designed 
to provide general healthcare, as they are are inherently issue-focused. This is related to, but 
not the same thing as mission drift, and makes them unsuitable to provide general healthcare 
to a population. This is exacerbated when the government has outsourced its responsibilities 
to INGOs and, due to brain and resource drain, has not built up the capacity to provide care 
for the issue itself. Thus, if an INGO’s mission drifts and it no longer provides either broad 
based care or care in a specific issue sphere, a gap is left in the health system and care for 
that health issue is not addressed. Moreover, the vacuum created by the exit of INGOs’ can 
leave the public health system worse off than if the INGO never entered the issue sphere in 
the first place, as it is highly destabilizing. Mission drift, then, is one compelling reason why 
INGOs cannot be relied upon to provide stable, long-term healthcare and are not a 
permanent solution for weak health system infrastructure in developing countries. 
Furthermore, we find that the micromarket causes INGOs to operate in an insular 
community, separating the sector from the communities it serves, drawing its attention and 
resources, and decreasing its downward accountability. Unlike public healthcare providers, 




influenced by more actors than just the population they are serving. Namely, INGOs must 
attract both funding and staff, and are beholden to the donor community before the public. 
Furthermore, because neither INGOs nor their staff are fixed - organizations drift to 
different causes and employees move between organizations -  the INGO sector is highly 
unstable. Insular and preoccupied with funding and staff movements, the INGO sector is 
not downwardly accountable to the population they are supposed to be serving. That is to 
say, even if INGOs do not “drift” from the issue sphere they work in, they may still not be a 
beneficial presence. 
Although a main argument in favor of INGOs is their better accountability and 
effectiveness as compared to developing governments, there is next to no empirical evidence 
to support this.203 On the contrary, the literature is firm that an increase in foreign funding 
leads to less downward accountability to the group of people they intend to help.204 Indeed, 
as the number of INGOs increase in a country there is increased inefficiency, more 
diversion of funds, and less downwardly accountable organizations.205 This is largely due to 
the INGO micromarket, which creates a disconnect between INGOs and the populations 
they serve. The micromarket structure of constantly shifting organizations and experts 
makes INGOs far less reliable than a stable entity with less turnover in its work force would 
be. INGOs’ insular market for funding and labor draws considerable effort. The resources 
INGOs must put in to maintain both their funding and their work force are substantial, and 
takes away from the resources and attention they could otherwise allocate to helping their 
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cause. The multiple concerns for INGOs - because of the micromarket they operate in - 
takes their attention away from healthcare provision. Thus, INGOs are less connected and 
accountable to the populations they serve than the national government is, and indeed may 
not be focused on the issue at hand even if they have not “drifted,” thus making them a 
poor substitute for state provided healthcare. 
In all, the micromarket makes INGOs unstable healthcare providers in the long run. 
They can be relied upon neither to provide care for one health issue long-term, nor to put 
the public interest before their own. Although the flexibility of INGOs is a benefit in many 
ways, it is a drawback when they are relied upon to be the sole provider of secure, long-term, 
general healthcare. INGOs are most beneficial when they complement a state health system 
and provide care to niche populations and issues; as one INGO employee who works on 
HIV/AIDS prevention for homosexuals and sex workers said, 
these groups… are sometimes very heavily stigmatized and governments just 
are not prepared to deal with them. Their clinic networks aren't friendly to 
these groups. Their parliaments are not are not friendly to these groups, 
sometimes these behaviors are illegal - whether it's homosexuality or drug use 
or prostitution. And so governments have a hard time dealing with these 
groups. But if they don't then these epidemics usually just continue… 
government services are never going to be really ready to serve these 
population groups.206  
 
In situations like this INGOs are well-suited to provide services, but in general they cannot 
be relied upon as a substitute to public healthcare- which is neither beholden to the whims 
of donors nor accountable to any entity other than the public, and is inherently less single-
issue focused. 
 
                                                




Why Not Private: Inequity and Low Quality Care 
As discussed above, INGOs are not an adequate replacement for national healthcare 
in the long-term. In this section, we will go on to explore why privatization is also an 
undesirable substitute for government healthcare. This is a pressing concern, as private care 
is massively more utilized in Cambodia than public care - and is only continuing to grow in 
size and influence.  
Possibly the largest concern of private sector participation is that many developing 
countries, including Cambodia, lack the regulatory capabilities necessary to ensure the 
efficiency and quality of private care. The literature, although lacking in uniformity in most 
areas, shares one consensus: under-regulated private sectors can be dangerous and 
counterproductive - leading to over prescription of corticosteroids, incomplete courses of 
antibiotics, unnecessary and expensive surgical procedures, dangerous prescriptions of 
conflicting medications, and uninformed health advice - particularly in the area of family 
planning.207 These costs are significant due to the size of the private sector in Cambodia. 
Private providers play a particularly large role in rural communities, as more than 40% of 
public sector general medical practitioners are located at central-level facilities in large cities 
not in rural areas.208 In fact, evidence suggests that the private professional health sector is 
now larger than the public healthcare sector in some regions of Cambodia - such as the 
province of Kampong Cham, as discussed previously.209 Thus, the private sector is not 
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functioning as a secondary provider of care in Cambodia, but rather as a primary contact 
point for many people seeking healthcare. 
Inequity of Access  
The danger with such a heavy reliance on private healthcare is that it reflects a 
mistaken belief that private healthcare is of a higher quality than public healthcare - the 
common idea that you “get what you pay for.” However, individuals seeking higher quality 
healthcare could instead end up funding an inefficient substitute for public care- at a much 
higher cost. The WHO estimates that the level of out of pocket expenditure (OOP) by 
households for healthcare in Cambodia is unacceptably high. It peaked at 84% of Total 
Health Expenditure (THE) in the late 1990s210 with the legalization of private health-care 
delivery, and remains around 74% as of 2014. This is high even in comparison with our 
relevant country indicators: Bangladesh had an OOP of 67% of THE in 2014, Lao had 34%, 
Sierra Leone had 61% and Vietnam had 36%.211 
         In a health system such as Cambodia’s, where out of pocket expenditure on 
healthcare by households is so high, equity of access to the healthcare system becomes a 
major concern. Such high out of pocket costs for healthcare, when not subsidized by an 
effective insurance or welfare system, can act as a significant barrier to entry for low SES 
individuals. The UHP Baseline demand survey (BDS) found that 14% of all household 
monthly income in Cambodia was spent on healthcare, predominantly in the private for-
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profit sector.212 In the Cambodian health system the Health Equity Fund, the current 
national insurance system, exempts those who qualify from many of the costs of healthcare 
– a system that was proposed as a method by which to increase the poor’s access to the 
healthcare system. However, only public facilities are required to accept HEF payments for 
treatment. This becomes an issue in rural areas, where the majority of the lowest income 
quintile live, as there is often no nearby public hospital. Thus, individuals are forced to seek 
private healthcare and pay the exorbitant out of pocket costs. Many low-income households 
cannot afford to lose 14% of their already insufficient income to healthcare costs, and 
therefore do not have the option of receiving proper high-quality care. The barrier of access 
to healthcare created by such high costs is demonstrated by the fact that less than 46% of 
those who even qualify for the Cambodian “poor people’s” healthcare insurance (the HEF) 
seek healthcare for themselves or their families.213 This percentage is even smaller in rural 
areas where access to healthcare is limited, mainly privately provided, and the education and 
resources provided by the government are fewer. In many rural areas, poor individuals are 
not even registered to receive HEF benefits, either due to the stigma of revealing one’s SES, 
a lack of literacy needed to complete the forms, or due to a lack of outreach by public 
officials. It is estimated that only 70% of those eligible for the HEF have begun or entered 
the process to receive its coverage, and even less actually finish the procedures.214 Thus 
despite the seeming solution to high health costs embodied in the HEF, since its benefits do 
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not apply to private facilities - the most predominant providers in poorer areas - many poor 
Cambodians are excluded from access to the healthcare system.    
          Additionally, rather than help reach the poor, private provision can increase inequity 
of access because it naturally favors those who can afford treatment. Data from 44 middle 
and low income countries suggests that higher levels of private-sector participation in 
primary healthcare are associated with higher overall levels of exclusion of poor people from 
treatment and care.215 As mentioned above, in the Cambodian system, the HEF exempts 
those who qualify from many of the costs of healthcare. However, since only public facilities 
are required to accept HEF payments the system essentially creates disincentives for private 
for-profit health staff to treat them, as they know the patients will be unable to cover the 
high out of pocket costs. Thus, even if the private providers do give treatment, it is often at 
quality levels that correspond to the amount the patient is able to pay.216 Given the 
prevalence of private healthcare in Cambodia (92% contact rate), particularly in rural regions 
where government disbursements to local public health facilities have been historically low, 
these disincentives are significant. Inequalities in out-of-pocket spending between income 
groups are widespread, with households in the highest income quintile spending sixteen 
times more than those in the lowest quintile217 (See figure below). This disparity reflects 
“affordability not illness – the prevalence of illness is greatest in the lowest income quintile – 
mainly because the poor have less disposable non-food income, face greater financial 
barriers, and are less likely to seek care when ill.”218  
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(Figure 10: Distribution of annual household OOP spending on healthcare by quintile.)219 
Low Quality Care 
Even those individuals who can afford private healthcare, however, are not 
guaranteed a high quality of care once they arrive. A mystery client study in Phnom Penh 
found that “57% of consultations with private providers were potentially hazardous and only 
32% met broad [Ministry of Health] guidelines.”220 A more recent study found “60 per cent, 
77 per cent, and 93 per cent of cases misdiagnosed in private facilities, small private 
consultation rooms, and the informal sector, respectively.”221 Although many countries 
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successfully or semi-successfully regulate their private sectors,222 countries with a lack of 
regulatory strength, such as Cambodia, often struggle to raise the care requirements for such 
providers, as even registering private practices as professional health providers can be 
difficult to accomplish and even more difficult to enforce.223 In all, this indicates that 
although Cambodia lacks a strong public health system, privatization is not the most 
efficient or even a sufficient means to fill the gap in health system capacity. 
Indeed, studies indicate that the dangers of under regulation in the Cambodian 
private sector extend past misdiagnosis. Surveys of Phnom Penh's practitioners suggests that 
they are characterized by an unusually high prevalence of: 1) an almost exclusive focus on 
curative services with virtually no health prevention or promotion activities, 2) a tendency 
toward polypharmacy and non-evidence based prescribing, 3) a reluctance to keep records 
and have them open to scrutiny, and 4) little enthusiasm for the agreed MoH/WHO 
evidence-based treatment protocols for the management of illnesses of key public health 
concern.224 This conclusion was reinforced in a more recent survey of 198 private doctors, 
which indicated that more than half of all consultations resulted in the inappropriate 
prescription of drugs.225 Similarly, a quality report from 2005 indicated that nearly “80% of 
prescriptions are dangerous or ineffective.”226 
                                                
222 Sekhri, Feachem, and Ni, “Public-private integrated partnerships demonstrate the potential to improve 
health care access, quality, and efficiency.” 
223 Kelsall and Heng, “Inclusive healthcare and the political settlement in Cambodia”. 
224 Vickery, Rose, Dixon, Kiri, and Wilkinson, “Private Practitioners in Phnom Penh: A Mystery Client 
Survey,” ii-16. 
225 Soeng, Chan, Grundy, Morn, and Samnang, “Evaluation of Immunization Knowledge, Practices, and 
Service-delivery in the Private Sector in Cambodia,” 96.  
226 “Pharmaceutical Sector Strategic Plan 2005-2010,” Kingdom of Cambodia Ministry of Health (2005): 




Although much of this problem is caused by poor training and regulation for the 
prescribing doctors, both in the public and private sectors, it is compounded in the private 
sector by market driven prescribing influenced by money and patient preferences. Many 
facilities in the private sector charge the patient by prescription, and therefore make more 
money from appointments where greater numbers of drugs are prescribed.227 Dr. Esther 
Wilson, an international physician working in Cambodia, describes the process of 
polypharmacy in her online reviews of the health system. She states that patients often leave 
private clinics with a small bag of multi-colored pills – most often of six different types-- 
without being given “an explanation of what drugs they were or what they do, let alone 
about possible adverse effects and contraindications.”228 See image below:  
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(Figure 11: Bag of prescribed pills.) 
Additionally, the bags almost always contain only one dose of each type of drug – 
irrespective of prescribing standards set by the MoH.229 This market phenomenon is also 
driven by many Cambodian patients’ preference for “strong” and “quality” medicine, which 
doctors are inclined to supply in order to increase the chances that the patient will return to 
their clinic over another. Dr. Florian Polsczek, a physician at the Calmette Hospital in 
Phnom Penh, explains this pressure: “patients had a high expectation of receiving tablets, 
intravenous fluids and injections, especially in private clinics; if such treatment was denied, 
even with an explanation, the patient was likely to lose confidence in the physician and leave 
                                                




the hospital.”230 Due to this belief that quantity and strength of medicine equals quality, 
private practices have incentives to continue this dangerous prescribing behavior in order to 
maintain their client base and keep public trust in their provision of care high. A physician in 
the study conducted by Daily et al. explains saying, “Patients want ‘quality’ medicine. They 
don’t say ‘ceftri [ceftriaxone]’ they just say that they want ‘quality’ medicine. With stronger 
medicine, they believe they recover faster and leave happier.”231 Physicians in the INGO 
sector refer to this phenomenon in the private sector as consumer-driven healthcare. 
Essentially, doctors provide the treatment patients want rather than the one they need in an 
effort to increase the rates at which patients visit their clinic. In our interview with PSK, an 
INGO earlier mentioned in our section on social enterprise, we were told, “I think it’s 
patient or consumer driven as well. There are a lot of discussions about that. You know like 
when you go to the clinic for fever. If the physician says ‘oh yeah you can have a nice pear 
and drink a lot of water’ or whatever, sometimes the patient or the family is not happy. They 
want to have an injection or IV... Sometimes in private clinics they just satisfy people.”232 
As this section has made evident, privatized healthcare is not a suitable alternative or 
replacement for a strong national healthcare system. The care currently provided is 
inequitable and dangerously unregulated. While regulation could improve the quality of care 
private practitioners provide, considering the issue of inequality in service provision, 
government efforts would be better channeled into improving the public health system. 
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Minutely regulating the private sector with the intention of it serving as a sole, or majority, 
provider is an insufficient solution for the gaps in capacity facing the healthcare system.  
Summary 
 In the previous chapter, we discussed the dual processes of brain and resource drain, 
and their detrimental effect on public sector capacity. In this chapter, we have described why 
decreases in public healthcare capacity and subsequent replacement of this capacity through 
INGO outsourcing and assumption by private providers is a concerning trend. Neither 
INGOs nor private healthcare are an acceptable substitute for state provided healthcare. 
INGOs are unstable because of their micromarket, and the private sector leads to 
inequitable and low quality care. Though there are many benefits to both INGO 
involvement in and privatization of healthcare, we find that a health sector where INGOs 
and private providers are the sole healthcare providers, rather than complementary 









 The interactions between these three pillars of healthcare are not new or unknown to 
those in the development community. On the contrary, the implications of outside forces 
operating in a developing country have been oft remarked upon. But the literature and 
analyses from experts seems often to miss the broad picture - discussions of the effects of 
INGOs are in one silo, the role of private providers in another, and the outlook for 
developing countries’ health system in yet another. A formal framework that critically 
examines all three is, in our view, missing. Cambodia serves as an excellent case study to 
examine these interactions, because both its INGO and private sectors are large and 
influential enough for their effects to be measurable. Based on our interviews and surveys, it 
is clear that individuals working in healthcare in Cambodia are aware that the current 
complex system produces perverse incentives, but few are aware of the whole picture.  
 Through our research, we attempted to begin the process of tying the literature and 
experiences of the three sectors into a cohesive analysis in order to tease out the 
implications. We argue that the use of INGOs and private providers as long-term solutions 
to a weak public health system is problematic. They drain the government of personnel and 
funding and provide poor, unstable, and inequitable care if allowed to become under-
regulated majority providers. Even more concerning is the concurrent hollowing out of 
public sector capacity - preventing the government from reassuming control of healthcare 





It is important to note that both the literature and our research agree that INGOs 
and the private sector have important roles to play in the healthcare sector of developing 
countries - these roles however, should be either as a permanent but minority 
complementary provider to a strong government system, or as temporary sole providers 
while governments build capacity. 
 In fact, a robust NGO and private sector have been very important in global 
development goals, but to be effective they need to be well-regulated and monitored in order 
to ensure that they are actively contributing to increasing the government’s health 
infrastructure and capacity.233 The problem in the Cambodian health sector lies in the fact 
that INGOs and the private sector are acting as permanent, majority providers, with the 
government demonstrating little interest in investing in or reassuming primary control of the 
sector. Investing and depending on these actors as sole providers is dangerous given the 
INGO sector’s micromarket and likelihood of mission drift, and the private sector’s lack of 
regulation which leads to inequity of access and low quality care.  
 The second concern with this balance between the three pillars is that even if the 
government were to attempt to reassume control, as we argue is desirable, the longer it takes 
to attempt it, the fewer resources - both human and financial - it will have to help it succeed. 
Indeed, due to the brain and resource drain described previously, as time passes, government 
capacity within the system is steadily decreasing.  
Due to beliefs held by some that INGO and private sector solutions are preferable 
to state provided healthcare, and the proposition by some experts that these sectors are a 
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“magic bullet” in all cases, many of these serious drawbacks have been overlooked. In fact, 
little has been done to prevent or alter the possible negative outcomes highlighted in this 
paper - largely because little research has been conducted globally, with developed 
governments and aid providers having largely relied on research based on assumed positive 
outcomes. This lack of skepticism and oversight suggests that the situation is unlikely to 
change without a concerted effort to highlight and study the aforementioned issues. Our 
research - although requiring further exploration - suggests that although developing public 
sectors can be inefficient and corrupt, it may be a necessary evil to continue to invest in their 
development in order to achieve sustainable long-term development goals. A regional health 
director with FHI 360 asserted in our interview with him, “that's really the only way to build 
capacity- is to try to deal with the corruption issues as best as you can but then really support 
the Ministry because these [Ministries of Health] are the ones there to stay.”234 While in the 
short-term circumventing the government in order to rapidly develop sectoral capacity may 
seem appealing, we argue that this perspective is short-sighted and it is necessary to invest in 
governments to create lasting change. 
  
                                                




VIII. Implications for Further Research 
 
 Although Cambodia is unusual in the size and influence of its INGO and private 
sectors, the complications it faces in balancing their interaction with its public system are not 
unique. Because the private and INGO sectors are so prominent in Cambodia it allows us to 
study the interactions and effects of these sectors with more precision than would be 
possible in countries where they are less visible. However, we believe the Cambodian case 
study nevertheless serves as a lesson for other countries: Given the negative outcomes due 
to outsourcing and privatization that we have discussed, it follows that similar losses of 
public sector capacity and harm to the health system as a whole could be occurring in other 
developing countries - even if on a smaller scale. While our work has drawn attention to the 
complex system of incentives and interactions at play, there is far more work to be done to 
create theoretical framework for how INGOs and privatization affect public health capacity 
and incentives to invest in its future. More research should be done to determine the many 
facets of this situation, how much of it is applicable to other developing countries, and what 
the ideal role for each sector is in order to create a strong health system.  
 The data we collected through our interviews was relatively narrow due to time and 
resource constraints. As such it would be beneficial to gather data from a broader cross-
section of the healthcare sphere - namely physicians and employees in the public sector. In 
general, more research is needed to fully understand the incentives and behaviors at play in 
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Appendix A: Methods  
 
Although literature concerning INGOs and privatization abounds , neither a specific 
case study of Cambodia nor an examination of the long-term effects of outside actors’ 
presence has been done to our knowledge. Thus, to examine our hypothesis, it was necessary 
for us to collect our own data. With this in mind we completed an IRB, applied for grant 
funding, and organized a field research trip to interview those working in our sector of 
interest. We also designed surveys using Qualtrics which we administered online in order to 
create quantitative data for us to analyze. We also collected additional data from various 
outside (public) sources to create a picture of the health system in Cambodia.    
Interviews and Surveys   
To conduct interviews we travelled to Cambodia and Thailand for three weeks in 
August of 2016. We conducted seventeen total interviews. Interviewees included executives 
of INGOs and LNGOs, USAID officials, DFAT officials, and a doctor with the Thai 
Ministry of Health. These interviews ranged between approximately 30 minutes to an hour 
and a half and roughly followed the interview guide attached in the appendix. We alternated 
taking the lead with asking questions and acting as the notetaker. Interviewees were selected 
using snowball sampling methods: we began by reaching out to contacts we were introduced 
to by several University of Michigan professors, as well as contacting potential candidates 
based on our research through email. Once we scheduled a time with the interviewee we 
asked them to provide the contact information for anyone else who may be interested in 
taking part in our interviews and sent our first contact email to them (template is attached in 




 After we completed our interviews, we sent follow up emails to the participants 
asking them to fill out a survey relevant to their experience. The surveys were intended for 
physicians, university students, INGO employees, and MoH employees. The surveys were 
designed on Qualtrics to take approximately fifteen minutes and were designed to be 
completed anonymously. Participants were able to take as many surveys as were relevant to 
their experience: e.g. a doctor who was also the president of an INGO would take both the 
physicians and INGO employees surveys. We asked that the participants take the survey, as 
well as pass the surveys on to their organizations and contacts. Additionally, we sent emails 
to other organizations and contacts we found in our research requesting that they complete 
the surveys. Altogether we sent out approximately 325 survey requests, and received 22 
responses. Because of this low response rate we did not use the survey responses as a 
primary source of data in this paper - rather, they were used as further background to 
develop our argument and as suggestions for other content areas to explore. Full survey 
results are available in aggregate format by request.  
Outside Data  
 In addition to data collected through our interviews and surveys, we utilized data 
available online to analyze health outcomes, health systems, and financial information for 
Cambodia and the INGOs therein. These data sets were primarily gathered from data 
available on APIs created by UNICEF, WHO (including the Health Accounts dataset and 
Health Information and Intelligence Platform), and OECD (both datasets and published 
reports). We also used data published by The World Bank (Integrated Fiduciary Assessment 
and Public Expenditure Review, Databank), USAID, the Cambodian Government’s Report 




Health Policy Project, Annear et al., and the financial reports of various INGOs (mentioned 
by name in the text). All of the above are data sources whose original data we used as 






Appendix B: Email Templates 
Dear , 
  
We are researchers associated with the University of Michigan in the United States and are studying the role of 
internationally based non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in developing countries. Our work is focused 
on the previously unstudied effects of INGOs on the local economy and political system. Attached you will 
find an expanded summary of our work and research design, if of interest. 
  
Based on your organization's prominence and the nature of its work, it would be an ideal participant in this 
study. Consequently, we would be most thankful if your organization could contribute to our research. 
  
To gather this data, we would be extremely grateful if your in-country director, operations and finance officer, 
or other leadership team member would be willing to meet with us for a brief interview (less than 45 minutes). 
We will be in Phnom Penh from August 8th to the 15th and would be happy to come to your place of work. If 
interested, please respond as such and we will contact you promptly with further details. 
  
Your participation by providing these brief responses will give invaluable insight into the impact of INGOs in 
Cambodia and will contribute to academic literature. 
  
Thank you very much for your time, 
  
Marnie A. Ginis and Alexandra Kuske 































We are currently studying the interaction between the public sector (government) and private sector (NGOs) in 
the healthcare industry in Cambodia/Thailand. As a prominent member of the aforementioned communities, 
we were hoping you could provide insight into the interaction between the two sectors both in policy making 
and the actual provision of healthcare to the general public. We will be using these interviews to provide 




All information/recordings gathered through the following interview will be kept on a secure laptop that is 
only accessible by the PI and CI for the project. You have the option of being referred to in the final paper by 
your title or first name, rather than your full name and title, if you prefer. All questions are optional - feel free 
to decline to respond to any question that you would prefer not to answer.  
 
All questions can be asked in person or emailed to the PI or CI at kuskale@umich.edu or mginis@umich.edu.  
 
Introductory Questions:  
 
1. What is your exact position within the organization? Vice chair 
2. What duties/obligations does this entail?  
3. Why did you choose to work for this organization? 
4. How long has your organization been involved in the healthcare sector in Cambodia/Thailand? 
5. Does your organization work closely with the private sector? 
6. How would you describe the collaboration between the private/public sectors in policy-making? 
7. How would you describe the collaboration between the private/public sectors in providing effective 
healthcare? 
 
Specific, In-depth Questions:  
 
1. Would you say that there has been an increase or decrease in NGO/private sector involvement in the 
healthcare sector over the last 20 years?  
a. If there has been an increase, do you see this as positive?  
i. If there has been an increase, has there been a corresponding increase in NGO 
influence in healthcare policy?  
b. If there has been a decrease in NGO involvement, has the government begun to fill the roles 
that they had assumed?  
2. To what degree does the government (public sector) regulate the private sector’s involvement in 
healthcare?  
a. What does this regulation entail? 
3. Thailand at this point in time has a much stronger health sector than it did 30 years ago. 
a. What developments do you think led to this improvement?  
b. Did NGOs/private sector play any role in this improvement?  




a. Has the focus of government healthcare programs changed over this time? 
5. If you had to give advice to another developing country on how to make effective healthcare a 
priority what would it be? 
a. What do you see as necessary to achieve the improvements that Thailand has?  







Appendix D: Informed Consent and Surveys 
 
Informed Consent  
 
Introduction: This survey attempts to collect information about differences in individual perception of the roles 
of NGOs and government services in the health care sector in Cambodia and Thailand.           
 
Procedures: You will be given a questionnaire that consists of a variety of open-ended and multiple choice 
questions. The questionnaire consists of approximately 20 questions and will take approximately 20 minutes or 
less. This questionnaire will be conducted with an online Qualtrics-created survey that has been printed and 
translated for your convenience.            
 
Risks/Discomforts: Risks are minimal for involvement in this survey. We ask that you answer every question, 
however if any question causes discomfort you may proceed to the next question without answering.             
 
Benefits: There are no direct benefits for participants. However, it is hoped that through your participation, 
researchers will learn more about the way the health care system and benefits are operating in the region.            
 
Confidentiality: All data obtained from participants will be kept confidential and will only be reported in an 
aggregate format (by reporting only combined results and never reporting individual ones). All questionnaires 
will be concealed, and no one other than then primary investigator and co-investigators listed below will have 
access to them. The data collected will be stored in the HIPPA-compliant, Qualtrics-secure database until it has 
been deleted by the primary investigator.            
 
Participation: Participation in this survey is completely voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at any time or 
refuse to participate entirely. If you desire to withdraw, please notify the principal investigator at this email: 
kuskale@umich.edu.  Or, if you prefer, inform the principal investigator as you leave.                
 
Questions about the Research: If you have questions regarding this study, you may contact Alexandra Kuske, at 




Q1 Please type your name below. This will count as an electronic signature, but will not be linked to your 
specific responses to any survey.  
 
Q2   I have read and understood the above consent form and desire of my own free will to participate in this 
study.  











Survey of Doctors 
 
Participation: Participation in this survey is completely voluntary. If you wish to skip any question, you can move 
on to the next question while leaving the answer space blank.  
 
Confidentiality: All participant data will be presented only in aggregate and will not be tied to any individual. Only 
the co-investigators will have access to the survey data which will be stored securely on the University of 
Michigan Qualtrics site.  
 
Questions: If you have questions on any part of this survey please contact Alexandra Kuske 
(kuskale@umich.edu) or Marnie Ginis (ginis@umich.edu).  
 
Q1 Please select which age group you belong to: 
● 18-24 years old  
● 25-34 years old  
● 35-44 years old  
● 45-54 years old  
● 55-64 years old  
● 65 years or older  
Q2 What religion do you practice? 
● Buddhism  
● Islam  
● Christianity  
● Jewish  
● Hindu  
● Other  
● Non-religious  
Q3 What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If currently enrolled, highest degree 
received.  
●   No schooling completed  
●   Primary school  
●   Some secondary school, no diploma  
●   Secondary school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED)  
●   Some university credit, no degree  
●   Trade/technical/vocational training  
●   Associate degree  
●   Bachelor’s degree  
●   Master’s degree  
●   Professional degree  
●   Doctorate degree  
Q4 What is your first/primary language? 
●   Thai  
●   Khmer  
●   Malay  




●   Chinese  
●   English  
●   French  
●   Burmese  
●   Other  
Q5 What is your current employment status? 
●   Employed for wages  
●   Self-employed  
●   Out of work  
●   Homemaker  
●   Student  
●   Military  
●   Retired  
●   Unable to work  
Q6 In which country are you currently living? 
●   Thailand  
●   Cambodia  
Display Following Question: If In which country are you currently living? Cambodia Is Selected 
Q7 Which is closest to your disposable income per month? (Taken fro CSES) 
●   33,000 - 57,000  
●   57,000 - 126,000  
●   126,000 - 229,000  
●   229,000 - 379,000  
●   379,000 - 589,000  
●   589,000 - 822,000  
Display Following Question: If In which country are you currently living? Thailand Is Selected 
Q8 Which is closest to your disposable income per month in Baht? (Taken fro SES Thailand) 
●   1,310 - 2,454  
●   2,454 - 3,881  
●   3,881 - 6,377  
●   6,377 - 16,905  
Q9 In which sector are you currently employed? Please choose all that apply. 
●   Private sector  
●   Public sector  
●   NGO sector  
Q10 The following practices occur commonly throughout the world. Please select how frequently you believe 
they happen in Cambodia:  
 Never Once a 
month  




2-3 ties a 
week  
Daily  
Over prescription of antibiotics            
Over prescription of corticosteroids          
Treatment without seeing the patient in-
person  
       




Referral of public sector patients to the 
doctor's private sector clinic  
          
Diagnosis without providing complete 
information to the patient  
            
Treatment that varies in quality by how 
much the patient can pay  
           
Q11 Please select the number of ties you have seen the following practices take place:  
 Never  Once a 
month  




2-3 ties a 
week  
Daily  
Over prescription of antibiotics              
Over prescription of corticosteroids              
Treatment without seeing the patient in-
person      
          
Unnecessary surgeries                     
Referral of public sector patients to the 
doctor's private sector clinic      
           
Diagnosis without providing complete 
information to the patient      
      
Treatment that varies in quality by how much 
the patient can pay  
              
Q12 Please select the number of ties you have participated in the following activities:  
 Never  Once a 
month  




2-3 ties a 
week  
Daily  
Over prescription of antibiotics                               
Over prescription of corticosteroids                               
Treatment without seeing the patient in-
person       
                        
Unnecessary surgeries                               
Referral of public sector patients to the 
doctor's private sector clinic       
                        
Diagnosis without providing complete 
information to the patient       
                        
Treatment that varies in quality by how much 
the patient can pay  
                        
Q13 What is your current employment title? 
Q14 In which sector was your first health-related job? 
● Private sector  
● Public sector  
● NGO sector  
Q15 What were your priory reasons for choosing to work in your current position? Please choose all that apply. 
● Salary/Wages  
● Benefits (healthcare, paid leave, vacation, etc.)  




● Necessity (i.e. only position you could get in your field, only job you were offered)  
● Prestige/social standing  
● Lack of bribes  
● Effectiveness/quality of service of the sector  
● Less corruption  
Q16 In which sector would you ideally like to be employed? 
● Private Sector  
● Public Sector  
● NGO Sector  
Q17 What are your primary reasons for wanting to be employed in this sector? 
● Salary/Wages  
● Benefits (healthcare, paid leave, vacation, etc.)  
● Work environment  
● Necessity (i.e. only position you could get in your field, only job you were offered)  
● Prestige/social standing  
● Lack of bribes  
● Effectiveness/quality of service of the sector  
● Less corruption  
Q18 In which sector do you feel that the quality of healthcare provision is the highest? 
● Public Sector  
● Private Sector  
● NGO Sector  
● All are equivalent  
Display Following Question: If In which sector do you feel that the quality of healthcare provision is the highest? All are equivalent 
Is Selected 
Q19 In which sector do you feel that the quality of healthcare provision is the lowest? 
● Public Sector  
● Private Sector  
● NGO Sector  
Q20 What do you feel is the largest challenge facing healthcare provision over the next 10 years? 
● Low public trust in healthcare provision  
● Low quality of private healthcare  
● Low quality of public healthcare  
● Availability of access to healthcare  
● Funding for public healthcare  
● Sustainability of NGO provided healthcare  
● Cost of healthcare services  
● Other  
Display Following Question: If What do you feel is the largest challenge facing healthcare provision over the next 10 years? Other 
Is Selected 
Q21 If you selected other, what do you feel is the largest challenge facing healthcare provision? 
 
 





Participation: Participation in this survey is completely voluntary. If you wish to skip any question, you can move 
on to the next question while leaving the answer space blank.  
 
Confidentiality: All participant data will be presented only in aggregate and will not be tied to any individual. Only 
the co-investigators will have access to the survey data which will be stored securely on the University of 
Michigan Qualtrics site.  
 
Questions: If you have questions on any part of this survey please contact Alexandra Kuske 
(kuskale@umich.edu) or Marnie Ginis (mginis@umich.edu).  
 
Q1 Please select which age group you belong to: 
● 18-24 years old  
● 25-34 years old  
● 35-44 years old  
● 45-54 years old  
● 55-64 years old  
● 65 years or older   
 
Q2 What religion do you practice? 
● Buddhism   
● Islam   
● Christianity  
● Jewish   
● Hindu    
● Other  
● Non-religious   
 
Q3 What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If currently enrolled, highest degree 
received. 
● No schooling completed  
● Primary school  
● Some secondary school, no diploma  
● Secondary school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED)  
● Some university credit, no degree  
● Trade/technical/vocational training  
● Associate degree  
● Bachelor’s degree  
● Master’s degree  
● Professional degree  
● Doctorate degree  
 
Q4 In which university are you currently enrolled or, if you have completed university, from which university 





Q5 What is your first/primary language? 
● Thai   
● Khmer  
● Malay  
● Karen  
● Chinese   
● English   
● French   
● Burmese   
● Other  
 
Q6 What is your current employment status? 
● Employed for wages   
● Self-employed   
● Out of work   
● Homemaker   
● Student   
● Military   
● Retired   
● Unable to work   
 
Q7 In which country are you currently living? 
● Thailand  
● Cambodia  
 
Display This Question: If In which country are you currently living? Cambodia Is Selected 
Q8 Which is closest to your disposable income per month in Riels? (Taken from CSES)   
● 33,000 - 57,000  
● 57,000 - 126,000  
● 126,000 - 229,000  
● 229,000 - 379,000  
● 379,000 - 587,000  
● 587,000 - 822,000  
 
Display This Question: If In which country are you currently living? Thailand Is Selected 
Q9 Which is closest to your per capita current income in Baht (SES Thailand)? 
● 1,310 - 2,454  
● 2,454 - 3,881  
● 3,881 - 6,377  
● 6,377 - 16,905  
 





Q11 In which sector would you ideally like to be employed? 
● Public   
● Private  
● NGO  
● Self-employed   
 
Q12 For your intended position, which sector do you believe pays higher wages? 
● Public   
● Private  
● NGO  
● Self-employed   
 
Q13 For your intended position, in which position do you think there is the highest opportunity to earn non-
salary income? 
● Public  
● Private  
● NGO  
 
Q14 Which sector receives larger non-salary benefits (e.g. healthcare, vacation, opportunities for advancement 
etc.)? 
● Public   
● Private  
● NGO  
● Self-employed   
 
Q15 Which sector is seen as a more prestigious area in which to work? 
● Public   
● Private  
● NGO  
● Self-employed   
 
Q16 In 10 years, in which sector would you like to be working? 
● Public  
● Private  
● NGO  
● Self-employed  
 
Q17 If yourself or a family member were ill and could go anywhere, in which hospital would you want them to 





Q18 Approximately how many times have you visited a health facility in the past year for yourself or your 
family member? 
● Not at all  
● Once  
● Twice  
● Three times  
● 4-6 times  
● More than 7 times  
 
Q19 Which health care provider do you see providing the most healthcare at the local level? 
● Publically run  
● Privately run  








Survey of Government Employees 
 
Participation: Participation in this survey is completely voluntary. If you wish to skip any question, you can move 
on to the next question while leaving the answer space blank.  
 
Confidentiality: All participant data will be presented only in aggregate and will not be tied to any individual. Only 
the co-investigators will have access to the survey data which will be stored securely on the University of 
Michigan Qualtrics site.  
 
Questions: If you have questions on any part of this survey please contact Alexandra Kuske 
(kuskale@umich.edu) or Marnie Ginis (mginis@umich.edu).  
 
Q1 Please select which age group you belong to: 
● 18-24 years old  
● 25-34 years old  
● 35-44 years old  
● 45-54 years old  
● 55-64 years old  
● 65 years or older   
 
Q2 What religion do you practice? 
● Buddhism   
● Islam   
● Christianity  
● Jewish  
● Hindu  
● Other  
● Non-religious  
 
Q3 What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If currently enrolled, highest degree 
received. 
● No schooling completed  
● Primary school  
● Some secondary school, no diploma  
● Secondary school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED)  
● Some university credit, no degree  
● Trade/technical/vocational training  
● Associate degree  
● Bachelor’s degree  
● Master’s degree  
● Professional degree  





Q4 What is your first/primary language? 
● Thai   
● Khmer  
● Malay  
● Karen  
● Chinese  
● English  
● French  
● Burmese  
● Other  
 
Q5 What is your current employment status? 
● Employed for wages   
● Self-employed  
● Out of work   
● Homemaker  
● Student  
● Military  
● Retired  
● Unable to work   
 
Q21 By which government are you currently employed?  
● Thailand  
● Cambodia  
 
Display This Question: If By which government are you currently employed? Cambodia Is Selected 
Q6 Which is closest to your disposable income per month in Riels? (Taken from CSES)   
● 33,000 - 57,000  
● 57,000 - 126,000  
● 126,000 - 229,000  
● 229,000 - 379,000  
● 379,000 - 587,000  
● 587,000 - 822,000  
 
Display This Question: If By which government are you currently employed? Thailand Is Selected 
Q7 Which is closest to your per capita current income in Baht (SES Thailand)? text 
● 1,310 - 2,454  
● 2,454 - 3,881  
● 3,881 - 6,377  





Q8 If you held a similar position in an NGO to your current position with the government do you think you 
would be paid: 
● Slightly more  
● A lot more  
● Slightly less  
● A lot less  
● The same  
 
Q9 If you held a similar position in an NGO to your current position with the government do you think your 
non-salary benefits (such as healthcare, vacation, paid leave, etc.) would be: 
● Much better  
● Slightly better  
● The same  
● Slightly worse  
● Much worse  
 
Q10 Do you feel that holding your position in the government or an equivalent position in an NGO is more 
prestigious? 
● NGO  
● Government  
● Neither  
 
Q11 In which do you feel it is more difficult or competitive to get a job of your description: 
● NGO  
● Government  
● Private sector  
● None  
 
Display This Question: If In which do you feel it is more difficult or competitive to get a job of your description: None Is Not 
Selected 
Q12 Why do you think it is more difficult in this sector? 
 
Q13 What were your primary reasons for choosing to work in your current position with the government? 
Please choose all that apply: 
● Salary/wages  
● Benefits (healthcare, vacation, paid leave, etc)  
● Work environment  
● Necessity (i.e. only position you could get in your field, only job you were offered)  
● Prestige/social standing  
● No need for bribes  
● Effectiveness/quality of service of the public sector  
● Mission of the government organization  





Q14 Have you worked for the private and/or NGO sector in the past? 
● Yes - the private sector  
● Yes - the NGO sector  
● Yes - both  
● No - neither  
 
Display This Question: If Have you worked for the private and/or NGO sector in the past? No - neither Is Not Selected 
Q15 Why did you choose to leave your position in the NGO and/or private sector? Please choose all that 
apply. 
● Salary/wages  
● Benefits (healthcare, vacation, paid leave, etc)  
● Work environment  
● Necessity (i.e. only position you could get in your field, only job you were offered)  
● Prestige/social standing  
● No need for bribes  
● Effectiveness/quality of service of the NGO sector  
● Mission of the NGO  
● Less corruption  
 
Q16 Do you strive to work in an equivalent position to yours in an NGO? 
● Yes  
● No  
 
Display This Question: If Do you strive to work in an equivalent position to yours in an NGO? Yes Is Selected 
Q17 If yes, what are your primary reasons? Please choose all that apply. 
● Salary/wages  
● Benefits (healthcare, vacation, paid leave, etc)  
● Work environment  
● Necessity (i.e. only position you could get in your field, only job you were offered)  
● Prestige/social standing  
● No need for bribes  
● Effectiveness/quality of service of the NGO sector  
● Mission of the NGO  
● Less corruption  
 
Q18 If yourself or a family member were ill and you could go anywhere, in which hospital would you want 





Q19 Approximately how many times have you visited a health facility in the past year for yourself or a family 
member? 
● Not at all  
● Once  
● Twice  
● Three times  
● 4-6 times  
● More than 7 times  
 
Q20 Which health care provider do you see providing health care at the local level? 
● Publically run  
● Privately run  
● Run by a NGO/non-profit  
 
Q21 What do you feel is the largest challenge facing healthcare provision over the next 10 years? Please choose 
all that apply. 
● Low public trust in healthcare provision  
● Low quality of private healthcare  
● Low quality of public healthcare  
● Availability of access to healthcare  
● Funding for public healthcare  
● Sustainability of NGO provided healthcare  
● Cost of healthcare services  
● Other  
 
Display This Question: If What do you feel is the largest challenge facing healthcare provision over the next 10 years? Please choose 
all that apply. Other Is Selected 
Q22 If you selected other, what do you feel is the largest challenge? 
 
Q23 How effective do you believe the collaborations between the private and public sector have been in the 
healthcare sector? 
● Extremely effective  
● Effective  
● Neutral  
● Ineffective  
● Extremely ineffective  
● Unsure  
 
Display This Question: If How effective do you believe the collaborations between the private and public sector have been in the 






Q25 Has government spending/budget for health care services increased or decreased in the last 20 years? 
● Increased  
● Decreased  
● Neither  








Survey of NGO Employees: 
 
Participation: Participation in this survey is completely voluntary. If you wish to skip any question, you can move 
on to the next question while leaving the answer space blank.  
 
Confidentiality: All participant data will be presented only in aggregate and will not be tied to any individual. Only 
the co-investigators will have access to the survey data which will be stored securely on the University of 
Michigan Qualtrics site.  
 
Questions: If you have questions on any part of this survey please contact Alexandra Kuske 
(kuskale@umich.edu) or Marnie Ginis (mginis@umich.edu).  
 
Q1 Please select which age group you belong to: 
● 18-24 years old  
● 25-34 years old  
● 35-44 years old  
● 45-54 years old  
● 55-64 years old  
● 65 years or older  
 
Q2 What religion do you practice? 
● Buddhism  
● Islam  
● Christianity  
● Judaism  
● Hinduism  
● Other  
● Non-religious  
 
Q3 What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If currently enrolled, highest degree 
received. 
● No schooling completed  
● Primary school  
● Some secondary school, no diploma  
● Secondary school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED)  
● Some college credit, no degree  
● Trade/technical/vocational training  
● Associate degree  
● Bachelor’s degree  
● Master’s degree  
● Professional degree  





Q4 What is your first/primary language? 
● Thai   
● Khmer  
● Malay  
● Karen  
● Chinese  
● English  
● French  
● Burmese  
● Other  
 
Q5 What is your current employment status? 
● Employed for wages  
● Self-employed  
● Out of work  
● Homemaker  
● Student  
● Military  
● Retired  
● Unable to work  
 
Q6 The NGO I work for is located in:  
● Cambodia  
● Thailand  
 
Display This Question: If The NGO I work for is located in: Cambodia Is Selected 
Q7 Which is closest to your disposable income per month (in thousand Riels)? (Taken from CSES) 
● 33,000 - 57,000  
● 57,000 - 126,000  
● 126,000 - 229,000  
● 229,000 - 379,000  
● 379,000 - 587,000  
● 587,000 - 822,000  
 
Display This Question: If The NGO I work for is located in: Thailand Is Selected 
Q8 Which is closest to your per capita current income in Baht (SES Thailand)? 
● 1,310 - 2,454  
● 2,454 - 3,881  
● 3,881 - 6,377  
● 6,377 - 16,905  
 





Q10 Have you previously held a similar position with the government or the private sector? 
● Yes - the government  
● Yes - the private sector  
● Yes - both  
● No - neither  
 
Display This Question: 
If Have you previously held a similar position with the government or the private sector? Yes - the government Is Selected 
Or Have you previously held a similar position with the government or the private sector? Yes - the private sector Is Selected 
Or Have you previously held a similar position with the government or the private sector? Yes - both Is Selected 
Q11 Why did you choose to leave your government and/or private sector position to work in an NGO? Please 
choose all that apply. 
● Salary/wages  
● Benefits (healthcare, vacation, paid leave, etc)  
● Work environment  
● Necessity (i.e. only position you could get in your field, only job you were offered)  
● Prestige/social standing  
● Lack of a bribe  
● Effectiveness/quality of service of the NGO sector  
● Mission of the NGO  
● Less corruption  
 
Q12 If you held a similar position in the government to your current position within your organization, do you 
think you would be paid: 
● Slightly more  
● A lot more  
● Slightly less  
● A lot less  
● The same  
 
Q13 If you held a similar position in the government to your current position within your organization do you 
think your non-salary benefits (such as healthcare, vacation, paid leave, etc.) would be: 
● Much better  
● Slightly better  
● The same  
● Slightly worse  
● Much worse  
 
Q14 Do you feel that holding your position in your NGO or an equivalent position in the government is more 
prestigious? 
● NGO  
● Government  





Q15 In which do you feel it is more difficult or competitive to get a job of your description: 
● NGO  
● Government  
● Private sector  
● None  
 
Display This Question: If In which do you feel it is more difficult or competitive to get a job of your description: None Is Not 
Selected 
Q16 What makes getting a position in the aforementioned sector more difficult? 
 
Q17 What were your primary reasons for choosing to work in your current position with an NGO? Please 
choose all that apply: 
● Salary/wages  
● Benefits (healthcare, vacation, paid leave, etc)  
● Work environment  
● Necessity (i.e. only position you could get in your field, only job you were offered)  
● Prestige/social standing  
● Lack of a bribe  
● Effectiveness/quality of service of the NGO sector  
● Mission of the NGO  
● Less corruption  
 
Q18 Do you strive to work in an equivalent position to yours with the government? 
● Yes  
● No  
 
Display This Question: If Do you strive to work in an equivalent position to yours with the government? Yes Is Selected 
Q19 If yes, what are your primary reasons? 
● Salary/wages  
● Benefits (healthcare, vacation, paid leave, etc)  
● Work environment  
● Necessity (i.e. only position you could get in your field, only job you were offered)  
● Prestige/social standing  
● Lack of bribes  
● Effectiveness/quality of service of the public sector  
● Mission of the Government Organization  
● Less corruption  
 
Q20 If yourself or a family member were ill and you could go anywhere, in which hospital would you want 





Q21 Approximately how many times have you visited a health facility in the past year for yourself or a family 
member? 
● Not at all  
● Once  
● Twice  
● Three times  
● 4-6 times  
● More than 7 times  
 
Q22 Which health care provider do you see providing health care at the local level? 
● Publically run  
● Privately run  
● Run by a NGO/non-profit  
 
Q23 What do you feel is the largest challenge facing healthcare provision over the next 10 years? Please choose 
all that apply. 
● Low public trust in healthcare providers  
● Low quality of private healthcare  
● Low quality of public healthcare  
● Availability of access to healthcare  
● Funding for public healthcare  
● Sustainability of NGO provided healthcare  
● Cost of healthcare services  
● Other  
 
Display This Question: If What do you feel is the largest challenge facing healthcare provision over the next 10 years? Please choose 
all that apply. Other Is Selected 
Q24 If you selected other, what do you see as the largest challenge facing healthcare provision? 
 
Q25 From where does your NGO receive the majority of its funding? Please select all that apply. 
● Personal donations  
● Private grants  
● Government grants  
● Fundraising events  
● Social enterprise  
● International organizations  
 
Q26 Have you found that your ability to raise these funds is consistent? 
● Yes  
● No  
● Unsure  
 




Q27 If not consistent, why?  
● Dependent on governments fund availability  
● Dependent on international aid fads/trends  
● Dependent on your organizations ability to fundraise/market each year  
● Dependent on government/public priorities for funding  
● Other  
 
Display This Question: If If not consistent, why?&nbsp; Other Is Selected 
Q28 If other, please explain: 
 
Q29 Has your mission stayed the same since the founding of your organization? 
● Yes  
● No  
● Unsure  
 
Display This Question: If Has your mission stayed the same since the founding of your organization? Yes Is Selected 
Q30 To what degree has the mission of your organization shifted over time? 
● A great deal  
● A lot  
● A moderate amount  
● A little  
● None at all  
 
Display This Question: If Has your mission stayed the same since the founding of your organization? Yes Is Selected 
Q31 How much of this change is due to the need for funding?  
● A great deal  
● A lot  
● A moderate amount  
● A little  
● None at all  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
